Disability and Causation in Workers' Compensation (7:IX) - Revision history

Nate Russell: 2026 update

2026-09-28T17:24:44Z

2026 update

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:24, 28 September 2026
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	Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.		Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.

	'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://~~www.~~canlii.~~org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009~~/~~2009bcsc1574~~/~~2009bcsc1574.html~~ Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://~~www.~~canlii.~~org/en~~/bc/~~bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html~~ Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://~~www.~~canlii.~~org~~/en/~~bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html~~ Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.		'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://canlii.ca/t/26ns1 Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://canlii.ca/t/1tf3b Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://canlii.ca/t/1ng77 Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.

	'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.		'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.
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	If serious and willful misconduct on the part of the worker is the sole cause of the injury, no compensation is paid unless death or severe disability results.		If serious and willful misconduct on the part of the worker is the sole cause of the injury, no compensation is paid unless death or severe disability results.

	In the 2015 BC case, ''WCAT-2015-02853 (Re)'', 2015 CanLII 97566, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal held that a worker’s decision to momentarily unbuckle his seatbelt to retrieve a fallen radio did not amount to “serious and wilful misconduct” under section 5(3) of the ''WCA''. Although the act was intentional and in breach of legal and employer safety requirements, the Tribunal emphasized that for misconduct to bar compensation, it must be both wilful (i.e., with pre-knowledge and a deliberate decision to break a rule) and serious (i.e., grave or severe in its effect). In this case, the worker’s conduct was found to be an impulsive response to the situation and more in the nature of negligence or poor judgment, rather than a flagrant disregard for safety. As a result, compensation was not barred.		In the 2015 BC case, ''[https://canlii.ca/t/gp80n WCAT-2015-02853 (Re)]'', 2015 CanLII 97566, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal held that a worker’s decision to momentarily unbuckle his seatbelt to retrieve a fallen radio did not amount to “serious and wilful misconduct” under section 5(3) of the ''WCA''. Although the act was intentional and in breach of legal and employer safety requirements, the Tribunal emphasized that for misconduct to bar compensation, it must be both wilful (i.e., with pre-knowledge and a deliberate decision to break a rule) and serious (i.e., grave or severe in its effect). In this case, the worker’s conduct was found to be an impulsive response to the situation and more in the nature of negligence or poor judgment, rather than a flagrant disregard for safety. As a result, compensation was not barred.

	=== 2. Secondary Conditions / Compensable Consequences ===		=== 2. Secondary Conditions / Compensable Consequences ===
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	As discussed above, if a worker suffers from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)		As discussed above, if a worker suffers from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)

	The ''[https://~~www.~~canlii.~~org/en/~~ca/~~scc/doc/2000/2000scc3~~/~~2000scc3.html~~ Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)]'', [2000~~<nowiki>]</nowiki> SCJ No 3~~] decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.		The ''[https://canlii.ca/t/5276 Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)]'', [2000] 1 SCR 55 decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.

	See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.		See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.
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	=== 3. Standard of Proof ===		=== 3. Standard of Proof ===

	Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable (''[https://~~www.~~canlii.~~org/en/~~ca/~~scc~~/~~doc/2016/2016scc25/2016scc25.html~~ Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2016 SCC 25]). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.		Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable (''[https://canlii.ca/t/gs78q Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2016 SCC 25 (CanLII)). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.

	=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===		=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===

Nate Russell: 2026 update

2026-09-28T17:15:30Z

2026 update

Show changes

Nate Russell at 22:13, 27 November 2025

2025-11-27T22:13:45Z

LSLAP at 19:05, 13 October 2025

2025-10-13T19:05:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:05, 13 October 2025
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	{{REVIEWED LSLAP \| date= ~~September 2, 2024~~}}		{{REVIEWED LSLAP \| date= 18 July 2025}}
	{{LSLAP Manual TOC\|expanded = workers}}		{{LSLAP Manual TOC\|expanded = workers}}

LSLAP: /* H. Section 135: Psychological Injuries */

2025-09-28T07:32:20Z

H. Section 135: Psychological Injuries

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	# predominantly caused by a significant work-related stressor, including bullying or harassment, or a cumulative series of such stressors, arising out of and in the course of employment.		# predominantly caused by a significant work-related stressor, including bullying or harassment, or a cumulative series of such stressors, arising out of and in the course of employment.

	A psychological injury which arises from a traumatic event must meet the usual causation test that employment was “as likely as not” the cause of the condition. Additionally, determining whether an event was traumatic involves both subjective and objective elements, but the subjective element is paramount (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc1178/2018bcsc1178.html?autocompleteStr=2018%2520BCSC%25201178%2520&autocompletePos=1 Atkins v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)'', 2018 BCSC 1178 at para 78]). The objective question is only to determine if the event is “identifiable.”		A psychological injury which arises from a traumatic event must meet the usual causation test that employment was “as likely as not” the cause of the condition. Additionally, determining whether an event was traumatic involves both subjective and objective elements, but the subjective element is paramount (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc1178/2018bcsc1178.html?autocompleteStr=2018%2520BCSC%25201178%2520&autocompletePos=1 Atkins v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2018 BCSC 1178 at para 78). The objective question is only to determine if the event is “identifiable.”

	A psychological injury which is caused by “stressors” (vs. “traumatic events”) must meet the “predominant cause” standard. This is a significant hurdle for workers with pre-existing psychological conditions who become disabled after work stressors, such as bullying or harassment. These conditions do not have to result in an injury immediately, stressors can make up the predominate cause of a condition that takes time to manifest or be diagnosed.		A psychological injury which is caused by “stressors” (vs. “traumatic events”) must meet the “predominant cause” standard. This is a significant hurdle for workers with pre-existing psychological conditions who become disabled after work stressors, such as bullying or harassment. These conditions do not have to result in an injury immediately, stressors can make up the predominate cause of a condition that takes time to manifest or be diagnosed.

LSLAP: /* 3. Standard of Proof */

2025-09-28T07:31:26Z

3. Standard of Proof

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:31, 28 September 2025
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	=== 3. Standard of Proof ===		=== 3. Standard of Proof ===

	Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable ([https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2016/2016scc25/2016scc25.html?autocompleteStr=Fraser%2520Health%2520Authority%2520v%2520Workers%2520Compensation%2520Appeal%2520Tribunal%252C%25202016%2520SCC%252025&autocompletePos=1 ''Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal'', 2016 SCC 25]). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.		Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable (''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2016/2016scc25/2016scc25.html?autocompleteStr=Fraser%2520Health%2520Authority%2520v%2520Workers%2520Compensation%2520Appeal%2520Tribunal%252C%25202016%2520SCC%252025&autocompletePos=1 Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2016 SCC 25]). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.

	=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===		=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===

LSLAP: /* 2. Secondary Conditions / Compensable Consequences */

2025-09-28T07:30:11Z

2. Secondary Conditions / Compensable Consequences

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:30, 28 September 2025
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	As discussed above, if the worker suffered from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)		As discussed above, if the worker suffered from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)

	The [https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc3/2000scc3.html?autocompleteStr=Kovach%2520v%2520work&autocompletePos=1 ''Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)'', [2000<nowiki>]</nowiki> SCJ No 3] decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker who is undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.		The ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc3/2000scc3.html?autocompleteStr=Kovach%2520v%2520work&autocompletePos=1 Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)]'', [2000<nowiki>]</nowiki> SCJ No 3] decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker who is undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.

	See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.		See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.

LSLAP: /* 1. Did the Injury Happen at Work? */

2025-09-28T07:29:23Z

1. Did the Injury Happen at Work?

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:29, 28 September 2025
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	Injuries may be caused by the normal actions or movements involved in the workplace as opposed to an abnormal event. For example, injuries caused by overexertion or repetitive movements can still be grounds for compensation even when done during routine work (RSCM II, C3-12.00).		Injuries may be caused by the normal actions or movements involved in the workplace as opposed to an abnormal event. For example, injuries caused by overexertion or repetitive movements can still be grounds for compensation even when done during routine work (RSCM II, C3-12.00).

	Activities resulting in injury that are reasonably incidental to the job are generally compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment. In Decision No 339/91 (an Ontario case from 1993), an employee was compensated for back injuries sustained by buttoning up her shirt in the washroom (on her worksite) prior to starting her shift (since going to the washroom was reasonably incidental). In a 2001 BC case, Decision No 2001-0417, Workers’ Compensation Reporter, (2001) vol 17, no 3 at 343 (BC Workers’ Compensation Board, Appeal Division), the worker was compensated for injuries sustained while attempting to pull a frozen trap door on his worksite despite evidence showing that his injury (a para-umbilical hernia) arose from a congenital condition (rather than stress, strain, work effort, or trauma -generally). The worker’s claim was initially dismissed but was successful upon appeal to the Review Board on the grounds that although such conditions may ordinarily not be compensable, the facts of this case supported the inference that the injury was actually caused by work stress. This case stressed the administrative law principle that an administrative agency must not fetter is discretion by mechanically applying a policy guideline without considering specific circumstances.		Activities resulting in injury that are reasonably incidental to the job are generally compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment. In Decision No 339/91 (an Ontario case from 1993), an employee was compensated for back injuries sustained by buttoning up her shirt in the washroom (on her worksite) prior to starting her shift (since going to the washroom was reasonably incidental). In a 2001 BC case, Decision No 2001-0417, Workers’ Compensation Reporter, (2001) vol 17, no 3 at 343 (BC Workers’ Compensation Board, Appeal Division), the worker was compensated for injuries sustained while attempting to pull a frozen trap door on his worksite despite evidence showing that his injury (a para-umbilical hernia) arose from a congenital condition (rather than stress, strain, work effort, or trauma -generally). The worker’s claim was initially dismissed but was successful upon appeal to the Review Board on the grounds that although such conditions may ordinarily not be compensable, the facts of this case supported the inference that the injury was actually caused by work stress. This case stressed the administrative law principle that an administrative agency must not fetter is discretion by mechanically applying a policy guideline without considering specific circumstances.

LSLAP: /* 1. Did the Injury Happen at Work? */

2025-09-28T07:28:49Z

1. Did the Injury Happen at Work?

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:28, 28 September 2025
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	Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.		Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.

	'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html?autocompleteStr=2009%2520BCSC%25201574&autocompletePos=1 Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html?autocompleteStr=2007%2520BCSC%25201580&autocompletePos=1 Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html?resultIndex=1\|Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.		'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html?autocompleteStr=2009%2520BCSC%25201574&autocompletePos=1 Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html?autocompleteStr=2007%2520BCSC%25201580&autocompletePos=1 Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html?resultIndex=1\| Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.

	'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.		'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.

LSLAP: /* 1. Did the Injury Happen at Work? */

2025-09-28T07:28:20Z

1. Did the Injury Happen at Work?

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:28, 28 September 2025
Line 46:		Line 46:
	Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.		Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.

	'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': [https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html?autocompleteStr=2009%2520BCSC%25201574&autocompletePos=1 ''Chima v ~~Workers’~~ Compensation Appeal Tribunal'', 2009 BCSC 1574], [https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html?autocompleteStr=2007%2520BCSC%25201580&autocompletePos=1 ''Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)'', 2007 BCSC 1580], and [https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html?resultIndex=1\|''Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.		'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html?autocompleteStr=2009%2520BCSC%25201574&autocompletePos=1 Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html?autocompleteStr=2007%2520BCSC%25201580&autocompletePos=1 Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html?resultIndex=1\|Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.

	'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.		'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:13, 27 November 2025
Line 46:		Line 46:
	Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.		Under sections 134 and 146 of the ''WCA'' [Former Act, s. 5], personal injury or death must '''arise out of''' and '''in the course of''' employment in order to be compensable. It is important to check policies and WCAT decisions for qualifying factors, as they can change.

	'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html~~?autocompleteStr=2009%2520BCSC%25201574&autocompletePos=1~~ Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html~~?autocompleteStr=2007%2520BCSC%25201580&autocompletePos=1~~ Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html~~?resultIndex=1\|~~ Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.		'''“Arising out of employment”''' relates to causation and means that the work must have '''causative significance''' to the injury. According to well-established jurisprudence, this means that the work does not have to be the sole or even the dominant cause of the injury; It must be only of causative significance greater than being trivial or ''de minimis'': ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1574/2009bcsc1574.html Chima v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2009 BCSC 1574, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc1580/2007bcsc1580.html Schulmeister v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2007 BCSC 1580, and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html Albert v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2006 BCSC 838]. Not all injuries at work are caused by work, as some are naturally occurring conditions which would have happened in any event. For example, a worker with heart disease, who is working in a sedentary job, may have a heart attack at the office. There is likely nothing in the work activity which would have causative significance to this injury.

	'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.		'''“In the course of employment”''' relates to the employment relationship at the time of injury. It generally refers to whether the injury or death happened at the time and place and during an activity reasonably related to the duties and expectations of the employment. Time and place are not strictly limited to the normal hours of work or the employer’s premises.
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	As discussed above, if the worker suffered from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)		As discussed above, if the worker suffered from a pre-existing condition and the injury aggravates, accelerates, or activates this condition, the resulting aggravation may also be compensable. ('''Note''': this policy is complex and should be consulted for specific details.)

	The ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc3/2000scc3.html~~?autocompleteStr=Kovach%2520v%2520work&autocompletePos=1~~ Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)]'', [2000<nowiki>]</nowiki> SCJ No 3] decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker who is undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.		The ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc3/2000scc3.html Kovach v Singh (Kovach v WCB)]'', [2000<nowiki>]</nowiki> SCJ No 3] decision upheld the Board’s policy that a worker who is undergoing treatment for a work injury remains in the course of employment, even if the treatment takes place long after the job itself has ended (even years after). This decision means that workers undergoing treatment for an injury or disease generally cannot sue negligent medical providers for medical malpractice.

	See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.		See also RSCM II, C3-22.00–22.40.
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	In reference to the second factor, the risk related to employment is determined by a whether a worker will be naturally exposed to those who have been diagnosed with COVID-19, such as hospital workers, or workers who have regular close interactions with customers, such as retail workers.		In reference to the second factor, the risk related to employment is determined by a whether a worker will be naturally exposed to those who have been diagnosed with COVID-19, such as hospital workers, or workers who have regular close interactions with customers, such as retail workers.

	More information can be found at [http://www.worksafebc.com/covid-19. www.worksafebc.com/covid-19.]		More information can be found at [http://www.worksafebc.com/covid-19. www.worksafebc.com/covid-19].

	== G. Special Issues for Occupational Disease Cases ==		== G. Special Issues for Occupational Disease Cases ==
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	=== 3. Standard of Proof ===		=== 3. Standard of Proof ===

	Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable (''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2016/2016scc25/2016scc25.html~~?autocompleteStr=Fraser%2520Health%2520Authority%2520v%2520Workers%2520Compensation%2520Appeal%2520Tribunal%252C%25202016%2520SCC%252025&autocompletePos=1~~ Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2016 SCC 25]). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.		Schedule 1 diseases and the diseases recognized by regulation (RSCM II, C4-25.10) have an “as likely as not” standard of proof for causation (''WCA'' s. 339 [Former Act, s. 99]). This means that where the evidence is equally weighted for different interpretations, the interpretation that favours the worker should be preferred. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a WCAT decision that an unusually high rate of cancer in a group of lab technicians was an Occupational Disease and therefore compensable (''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2016/2016scc25/2016scc25.html Fraser Health Authority v Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal]'', 2016 SCC 25]). Though experts had found little positive evidence supporting this link, the cancer rate in this group was highly unusual. Combined with the significant possibility of non-trivial exposure to harmful substances in the workplace, WCAT decided that that was enough to satisfy the “as likely as not” standard.

	=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===		=== 4. Survivor Benefits ===
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	# predominantly caused by a significant work-related stressor, including bullying or harassment, or a cumulative series of such stressors, arising out of and in the course of employment.		# predominantly caused by a significant work-related stressor, including bullying or harassment, or a cumulative series of such stressors, arising out of and in the course of employment.

	A psychological injury which arises from a traumatic event must meet the usual causation test that employment was “as likely as not” the cause of the condition. Additionally, determining whether an event was traumatic involves both subjective and objective elements, but the subjective element is paramount (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc1178/2018bcsc1178.html~~?autocompleteStr=2018%2520BCSC%25201178%2520&autocompletePos=1~~ Atkins v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2018 BCSC 1178 at para 78). The objective question is only to determine if the event is “identifiable.”		A psychological injury which arises from a traumatic event must meet the usual causation test that employment was “as likely as not” the cause of the condition. Additionally, determining whether an event was traumatic involves both subjective and objective elements, but the subjective element is paramount (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc1178/2018bcsc1178.html Atkins v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal)]'', 2018 BCSC 1178 at para 78). The objective question is only to determine if the event is “identifiable.”

	A psychological injury which is caused by “stressors” (vs. “traumatic events”) must meet the “predominant cause” standard. This is a significant hurdle for workers with pre-existing psychological conditions who become disabled after work stressors, such as bullying or harassment. These conditions do not have to result in an injury immediately, stressors can make up the predominate cause of a condition that takes time to manifest or be diagnosed.		A psychological injury which is caused by “stressors” (vs. “traumatic events”) must meet the “predominant cause” standard. This is a significant hurdle for workers with pre-existing psychological conditions who become disabled after work stressors, such as bullying or harassment. These conditions do not have to result in an injury immediately, stressors can make up the predominate cause of a condition that takes time to manifest or be diagnosed.