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Difference between revisions of "Criminal Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1:IX)"

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{{REVIEWED LSLAP | date= July 26, 2021}}
{{REVIEWED LSLAP | date= July 27, 2021}}
{{LSLAP Manual TOC|expanded = criminal}}
{{LSLAP Manual TOC|expanded = criminal}}


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Section 1 arises in cases where a ''Charter'' infringement is being argued. In order for the ''Charter'' infringement to be justified, the government has to prove to a court that its actions satisfy the steps in a section 1 analysis. The standard of proof is the civil standard – on the balance of probabilities, which is not as difficult to prove as the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 1 arises in cases where a ''Charter'' infringement is being argued. In order for the ''Charter'' infringement to be justified, the government has to prove to a court that its actions satisfy the steps in a section 1 analysis. The standard of proof is the civil standard – on the balance of probabilities, which is not as difficult to prove as the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.


The ''Oakes'' Test is a legal test created by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case ''R v Oakes'', [1986] 1 SCR 103. ''R v Oakes'' provided the Court with the opportunity to interpret the wording of section 1 of the ''Charter'' and to explain how section 1 would apply to a case. The result was the ''Oakes'' Test – a test that is used every time a ''Charter'' violation is found.
The ''Oakes'' Test is a legal test created by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case ''R v Oakes'', [1986] 1 SCR 103. ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1986/1986canlii46/1986canlii46.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAJciB2IG9ha2VzAAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Oakes]'' provided the Court with the opportunity to interpret the wording of section 1 of the ''Charter'' and to explain how section 1 would apply to a case. The result was the ''Oakes'' Test – a test that is used every time a ''Charter'' violation is found.


The ''Oakes'' Test sets out several criteria to determine if a violation can be justified under section 1:  
The ''Oakes'' Test sets out several criteria to determine if a violation can be justified under section 1:  
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Section 11 – Any person charged with an offence has the right: (b) to be tried within a reasonable time.
Section 11 – Any person charged with an offence has the right: (b) to be tried within a reasonable time.
In addition to the right to make full answer and defence, any person “has the right to be tried within a reasonable time”. The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in ''R v Jordan'', 2016 SCC 27, has addressed the issue of what constitutes a “reasonable time”. ''Jordan'' created a presumptive ceiling, beyond which any delay is presumed to be unreasonable, of 18 months for matters proceeding in provincial courts, or 30 months for matters proceeding in superior courts.  
In addition to the right to make full answer and defence, any person “has the right to be tried within a reasonable time”. The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2016/2016scc27/2016scc27.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IGpvcmRhbgAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Jordan]'', 2016 SCC 27, has addressed the issue of what constitutes a “reasonable time”. ''Jordan'' created a presumptive ceiling, beyond which any delay is presumed to be unreasonable, of 18 months for matters proceeding in provincial courts, or 30 months for matters proceeding in superior courts.  
The appropriate remedy for the State’s breach of one’s s. 11(b) rights is a judicial stay of proceedings arising from s. 24(1) of the ''Charter''. One can make a ''Charter'' challenge for the breach of s. 11(b) under the ''Constitutional Question Act'', RSBC 1996, c. 68, which requires that notice of this challenge be given to both Provincial and Federal prosecutors.  
The appropriate remedy for the State’s breach of one’s s. 11(b) rights is a judicial stay of proceedings arising from s. 24(1) of the ''Charter''. One can make a ''Charter'' challenge for the breach of s. 11(b) under the ''Constitutional Question Act'', RSBC 1996, c. 68, which requires that notice of this challenge be given to both Provincial and Federal prosecutors.  
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* to be informed of the right to remain silent;
* to be informed of the right to remain silent;
* to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and
* to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and
* to be informed of the existence and availability of the applicable systems of duty counsel and Legal Aid in the jurisdiction, in order to give the detainee a full understanding of the right to retain and instruct counsel (''R v Brydges'' [1990] 1 SCR 190).
* to be informed of the existence and availability of the applicable systems of duty counsel and Legal Aid in the jurisdiction, in order to give the detainee a full understanding of the right to retain and instruct counsel (''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii123/1990canlii123.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALciB2IGJyeWRnZXMAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v Brydges]'' [1990] 1 SCR 190).


The wording of the ''Charter'' suggests that the right to counsel is not absolute, but rather that it is available only to a person who is under arrest or in detention. The ''Charter'' right to counsel is thus triggered where a person is arrested or detained (see ''R. v. Grant'', below).  
The wording of the ''Charter'' suggests that the right to counsel is not absolute, but rather that it is available only to a person who is under arrest or in detention. The ''Charter'' right to counsel is thus triggered where a person is arrested or detained (see ''R. v. Grant'', below).  


Under s 10(b), the arresting officer has a duty to cease questioning or otherwise attempt to elicit evidence from the detainee until the detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel (''R v Manninen'' [1987] 1 SCR 1233). The arrested person has both the right to Legal Aid counsel and the right to be informed of this right: see ''R v Brydges'' and ''R v Prosper'' [1994] 3 SCR 236.
Under s 10(b), the arresting officer has a duty to cease questioning or otherwise attempt to elicit evidence from the detainee until the detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel (''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1987/1987canlii67/1987canlii67.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAMciB2IG1hbm5pbmVuAAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Manninen]'' [1987] 1 SCR 1233). The arrested person has both the right to Legal Aid counsel and the right to be informed of this right: see ''R v Brydges'' and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii65/1994canlii65.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALciB2IHByb3NwZXIAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v Prosper]'' [1994] 3 SCR 236.


Issues may arise at trial when an accused gave a statement to the police or provided bodily samples of some sort. In such cases, defence counsel should seek to have the evidence excluded under section 24(2) of the ''Charter''.   
Issues may arise at trial when an accused gave a statement to the police or provided bodily samples of some sort. In such cases, defence counsel should seek to have the evidence excluded under section 24(2) of the ''Charter''.   
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:'''NOTE:''' ''Brydges''’ Line is a province-wide service that is available for arrested persons 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A lawyer is always available to speak to the person for free.
:'''NOTE:''' ''Brydges''’ Line is a province-wide service that is available for arrested persons 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A lawyer is always available to speak to the person for free.


:'''NOTE:''' Detention under sections 9 and 10 of the ''Charter'' refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with a restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct that they had no choice but to comply. ''See R v Grant'', [2009] 2 SCR 353, for more details.
:'''NOTE:''' Detention under sections 9 and 10 of the ''Charter'' refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with a restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct that they had no choice but to comply. ''See [https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2009/2009scc32/2009scc32.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAJciB2IGdyYW50AAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Grant]'', [2009] 2 SCR 353, for more details.


== E. Lawful arrest ==
== E. Lawful arrest ==
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* ss 511 – 514: warrant to arrest.
* ss 511 – 514: warrant to arrest.


Sections 7, 10, and 24 of the ''Charter'' have some measure of effect on arrest procedure, particularly in relation to the conduct of arresting officers and the admissibility of evidence: see ''R. v. Stevens'', [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1153. There is also well-developed case law on arrest procedure. See ''Christie v Leachinsky'', [1947] AC 573 (HL) and section 29 of the ''Criminal Code''.
Sections 7, 10, and 24 of the ''Charter'' have some measure of effect on arrest procedure, particularly in relation to the conduct of arresting officers and the admissibility of evidence: see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1988/1988canlii44/1988canlii44.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALciB2IHN0ZXZlbnMAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=2 R. v. Stevens]'', [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1153. There is also well-developed case law on arrest procedure. See ''Christie v Leachinsky'', [1947] AC 573 (HL) and section 29 of the ''Criminal Code''.


== F. Search and seizure: s 8 ==
== F. Search and seizure: s 8 ==
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=== 1. Search of premises, vehicles, and interception of private communications ===
=== 1. Search of premises, vehicles, and interception of private communications ===
In general, police must have a search warrant to search a person’s premises (see ''R v Feeney'', [1997] 2 SCR 13). However, there are exceptions where exigent circumstances exist to allow warrantless searches.   
In general, police must have a search warrant to search a person’s premises (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1997/1997canlii342/1997canlii342.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IGZlZW5leQAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Feeney]'', [1997] 2 SCR 13). However, there are exceptions where exigent circumstances exist to allow warrantless searches.   


If a person can establish a reasonable expectation of privacy over the area searched, then a valid search and seizure requires prior authorization by a Justice of the Peace, who must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that an offence has been committed, and that evidence of that offence will be found in the place being searched.
If a person can establish a reasonable expectation of privacy over the area searched, then a valid search and seizure requires prior authorization by a Justice of the Peace, who must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that an offence has been committed, and that evidence of that offence will be found in the place being searched.


As a general rule, a search of premises must be based on reasonable grounds. If a search is conducted merely on a suspicion, the search will likely constitute a violation of section 8 of the Charter. In the case of ''R v Kokesch'' [1990] 3 SCR 3, the search was held to be unreasonable even though a warrant had been issued, because the basis for the warrant was unreasonable and an unlawful search of the premises, based merely on suspicion.  As a result, the search warrant was struck down and the search was deemed warrantless, and all items seized were excluded from the trial.  
As a general rule, a search of premises must be based on reasonable grounds. If a search is conducted merely on a suspicion, the search will likely constitute a violation of section 8 of the Charter. In the case of ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii55/1990canlii55.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALciB2IGtva2VzY2gAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v Kokesch]'' [1990] 3 SCR 3, the search was held to be unreasonable even though a warrant had been issued, because the basis for the warrant was unreasonable and an unlawful search of the premises, based merely on suspicion.  As a result, the search warrant was struck down and the search was deemed warrantless, and all items seized were excluded from the trial.  


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When assessing the ITO, first determine if the affidavits filed in support of the warrant establish reasonable grounds for searching the location, based on the contents of the ITO (assuming the contents are true).  If the ITO on its face provides sufficient grounds to issue a warrant then the ITO must be compared to the information the police had available at the time they applied for the search warrant to assess whether the police made full, fair and frank disclosure of all material relevant to the request to search that location.  The ITO as an ''ex-parte'' application should provide full, fair and frank disclosure of all material facts relevant to the police investigation and knowledge of the place searched at the time the ITO was sworn.  If there are important errors or omissions in the facts stated in the ITO, then an application can be made to cross-examine the affiant of the ITO as a sub-facial challenge to the ITO, in an effort to show either that had the true state of affairs been disclosed in the ITO, the warrant would not have been issued or that the police intentionally misled the authorizing justice.
When assessing the ITO, first determine if the affidavits filed in support of the warrant establish reasonable grounds for searching the location, based on the contents of the ITO (assuming the contents are true).  If the ITO on its face provides sufficient grounds to issue a warrant then the ITO must be compared to the information the police had available at the time they applied for the search warrant to assess whether the police made full, fair and frank disclosure of all material relevant to the request to search that location.  The ITO as an ''ex-parte'' application should provide full, fair and frank disclosure of all material facts relevant to the police investigation and knowledge of the place searched at the time the ITO was sworn.  If there are important errors or omissions in the facts stated in the ITO, then an application can be made to cross-examine the affiant of the ITO as a sub-facial challenge to the ITO, in an effort to show either that had the true state of affairs been disclosed in the ITO, the warrant would not have been issued or that the police intentionally misled the authorizing justice.
See ''R v Garofoli'' [1990] 2 SCR 1421 and ''R v Araujo'' [2000] 2 SCR 992 for more information on challenging search warrants.   
See ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii52/1990canlii52.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAMciB2IGdhcm9mb2xpAAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Garofoli]'' [1990] 2 SCR 1421 and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc65/2000scc65.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IGFyYXVqbwAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Araujo]'' [2000] 2 SCR 992 for more information on challenging search warrants.   
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|}


A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable and the onus is on the party seeking to justify the search and seizure to rebut this presumption: see ''Hunter v Southam Inc'', [1984], 2 SCR 145. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized several situations where authorities may conduct a search without warrants – for example where evidence of the offence is in plain view, or where the occupant of the premises has consented to the search.  
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable and the onus is on the party seeking to justify the search and seizure to rebut this presumption: see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1984/1984canlii33/1984canlii33.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAQaHVudGVyIHYgc291dGhhbQAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 Hunter v Southam Inc]'', [1984], 2 SCR 145. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized several situations where authorities may conduct a search without warrants – for example where evidence of the offence is in plain view, or where the occupant of the premises has consented to the search.  


A search warrant authorizes the police to enter and search a specific location during a specific period of time and an occupant of the premises to be searched has a right to view the search warrant before the search is conducted.  An occupant should check the address on the warrant and the time that the search is authorized to ensure that the warrant actually authorizes the search.  Unless the warrant states that the police may enter and search a specific address during the time the police arrive at the occupant’s address then the occupant should point out to the police that the warrant is either not for the occupant’s address or has expired and may refuse police access to the residence.  If the police nonetheless insist on entering the location and searching it, there is little practically speaking that can be done to stop the search while it is occurring, there may however be a civil right of action against them in trespass and a strong argument in any subsequent criminal case that any items seized should be excluded from evidence.
A search warrant authorizes the police to enter and search a specific location during a specific period of time and an occupant of the premises to be searched has a right to view the search warrant before the search is conducted.  An occupant should check the address on the warrant and the time that the search is authorized to ensure that the warrant actually authorizes the search.  Unless the warrant states that the police may enter and search a specific address during the time the police arrive at the occupant’s address then the occupant should point out to the police that the warrant is either not for the occupant’s address or has expired and may refuse police access to the residence.  If the police nonetheless insist on entering the location and searching it, there is little practically speaking that can be done to stop the search while it is occurring, there may however be a civil right of action against them in trespass and a strong argument in any subsequent criminal case that any items seized should be excluded from evidence.


=== 2. Search after valid arrest and search of person ===
=== 2. Search after valid arrest and search of person ===
At common law, upon a lawful arrest, an officer acquires an attendant right to search for officer safety and evidence (see ''R v Klimchuk'', [1991] 67 CCC (3d) 385 (BCCA)). (Please review the section on Lawful Arrest above). Note: Such a search requires a lawful arrest and is subject to a challenge if the arrest was not lawful. (See '''Section E on Lawful Arrest''').
At common law, upon a lawful arrest, an officer acquires an attendant right to search for officer safety and evidence (see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/1991/1991canlii3958/1991canlii3958.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAMciB2IGtsaW1jaHVrAAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Klimchuk]'', [1991] 67 CCC (3d) 385 (BCCA)). (Please review the section on Lawful Arrest above). Note: Such a search requires a lawful arrest and is subject to a challenge if the arrest was not lawful. (See '''Section E on Lawful Arrest''').


Where no arrest has taken place, a peace officer may also acquire a more limited right to search for officer safety. If an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual has a specific connection to a crime and detains that individual for further investigation, then incidental to this investigative detention, the officer may engage in a limited pat-down search confined in scope to locate weapons; see R v Mann, [2004] 3 SCR 59.
Where no arrest has taken place, a peace officer may also acquire a more limited right to search for officer safety. If an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual has a specific connection to a crime and detains that individual for further investigation, then incidental to this investigative detention, the officer may engage in a limited pat-down search confined in scope to locate weapons; see [https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2004/2004scc52/2004scc52.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAIciB2IG1hbm4AAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v Mann], [2004] 3 SCR 59.


For more information on searches of the person, see ''R v Debot'' [1989] 2 SCR 1140, ''R v Ferris'' [1998] BCJ No 1415 (CA), and ''R v Simmons'' [1988] 2 SCR 495.
For more information on searches of the person, see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1989/1989canlii13/1989canlii13.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAJciB2IGRlYm90AAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Debot]'' [1989] 2 SCR 1140, ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/1998/1998canlii5926/1998canlii5926.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IGZlcnJpcwAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Ferris]'' [1998] BCJ No 1415 (CA), and ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1988/1988canlii12/1988canlii12.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALciB2IHNpbW1vbnMAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v Simmons]'' [1988] 2 SCR 495.


== G. Right to remain silent: s 7 ==
== G. Right to remain silent: s 7 ==
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'''An accused should be further advised that when they are being questioned any conversation with police can only hurt them.''' Police will usually ask the accused for “their side of the story”. What police are looking to obtain are admissions like “I was there, but I didn’t do that”. This would be a confession that the accused was present at the scene, which the Crown may not otherwise be able to prove.
'''An accused should be further advised that when they are being questioned any conversation with police can only hurt them.''' Police will usually ask the accused for “their side of the story”. What police are looking to obtain are admissions like “I was there, but I didn’t do that”. This would be a confession that the accused was present at the scene, which the Crown may not otherwise be able to prove.


It is best for an accused to say nothing to the police until after consulting a lawyer. This applies even when an accused plans to plead guilty, because there may be a valid defence to the charge that the accused does not know about. For further information, see ''R v Hebert'' [1990] 2 SCR 151.
It is best for an accused to say nothing to the police until after consulting a lawyer. This applies even when an accused plans to plead guilty, because there may be a valid defence to the charge that the accused does not know about. For further information, see ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii118/1990canlii118.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IGhlYmVydAAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Hebert]'' [1990] 2 SCR 151.


=== 2. The modern confessions rule: ''Oickle'' ===
=== 2. The modern confessions rule: ''Oickle'' ===
The modern confessions rule is outlined in ''R v Oickle'' [2000] 2 SCR 3. A confession or admission to a police officer (or other authority figure like transit police or private security officers) by an accused will not admissible if it is made under circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt as to its voluntariness. The burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession falls on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if it appears that the Crown can satisfy that burden, the accused should consider calling evidence regarding the voluntariness of the confession so as to cast doubt on the voluntariness of that confession.
The modern confessions rule is outlined in ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2000/2000scc38/2000scc38.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAKciB2IG9pY2tsZQAAAAAB&resultIndex=1 R v Oickle]'' [2000] 2 SCR 3. A confession or admission to a police officer (or other authority figure like transit police or private security officers) by an accused will not admissible if it is made under circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt as to its voluntariness. The burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession falls on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if it appears that the Crown can satisfy that burden, the accused should consider calling evidence regarding the voluntariness of the confession so as to cast doubt on the voluntariness of that confession.


When arguing that a confession was not voluntary, consider the following:
When arguing that a confession was not voluntary, consider the following:
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A person who commits a pedestrian offence must state their name and address when asked by a police officer or that person may be subject to arrest (City of Vancouver, By-law No 2849, ''Street and Traffic By-law'' (10 May 2005)).
A person who commits a pedestrian offence must state their name and address when asked by a police officer or that person may be subject to arrest (City of Vancouver, By-law No 2849, ''Street and Traffic By-law'' (10 May 2005)).


The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in ''Moore v The Queen'' [1979] 1 SCR 195 suggests that the same is true for offences committed while riding a bicycle. While the police have no power to arrest a person for this type of summary conviction offence, the police may do so lawfully if it is necessary to establish the identity of the accused.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1978/1978canlii160/1978canlii160.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQARbW9vcmUgdiB0aGUgcXVlZW4AAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 Moore v The Queen]'' [1979] 1 SCR 195 suggests that the same is true for offences committed while riding a bicycle. While the police have no power to arrest a person for this type of summary conviction offence, the police may do so lawfully if it is necessary to establish the identity of the accused.


==== c) Federal statutes ====
==== c) Federal statutes ====
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(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  


Section 24 of the ''Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'' provides remedies to those whose ''Charter'' rights have been violated. The burden lies on the applicant to establish a ''Charter'' violation. The standard is based on a balance of probabilities. Once the ''Charter'' violation is proven, the focus shifts on matters concerning the possible effects on the fairness of the trial if the evidence was admitted. The three factors to be balanced in order to determine if the evidence should be excluded are i) the seriousness of the ''Charter'' infringing state conduct, ii) the impact of the ''Charter'' breach on the accused’s interest, and iii) society’s interest on the adjudication of the case on its merits (''R v Grant'')  [2009] 2 SCR 353The burden is on the accused to establish on a balance of probabilities that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).  See ''R v Harrison'' 2009 SCC 34 for more information on the section 24(2) test.
Section 24 of the ''Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'' provides remedies to those whose ''Charter'' rights have been violated. The burden lies on the applicant to establish a ''Charter'' violation. The standard is based on a balance of probabilities. Once the ''Charter'' violation is proven, the focus shifts on matters concerning the possible effects on the fairness of the trial if the evidence was admitted. The three factors to be balanced in order to determine if the evidence should be excluded are i) the seriousness of the ''Charter'' infringing state conduct, ii) the impact of the ''Charter'' breach on the accused’s interest, and iii) society’s interest on the adjudication of the case on its merits (''R v Grant'')  [2009] 2 SCR 353The burden is on the accused to establish on a balance of probabilities that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).  See ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2009/2009scc34/2009scc34.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAMciB2IGhhcnJpc29uAAAAAAE&resultIndex=1 R v Harrison]'' 2009 SCC 34 for more information on the section 24(2) test.


The type of remedy a court gives normally depends on the type of government action that violates the ''Charter''. If a government official took the action – for example, a police officer conducted an unreasonable search – the court will give an individual remedy that only applies to the person whose rights were breached (i.e., the court may say that the drugs found during the illegal search cannot be used as evidence in the criminal trial. This helps the accused person, but it doesn’t change the law for anyone else). In other cases, the court may be able to do something else, like stop a prosecution (a judicial stay of proceedings), order one side to pay the other side’s legal costs, or declare that certain rights were violated.  
The type of remedy a court gives normally depends on the type of government action that violates the ''Charter''. If a government official took the action – for example, a police officer conducted an unreasonable search – the court will give an individual remedy that only applies to the person whose rights were breached (i.e., the court may say that the drugs found during the illegal search cannot be used as evidence in the criminal trial. This helps the accused person, but it doesn’t change the law for anyone else). In other cases, the court may be able to do something else, like stop a prosecution (a judicial stay of proceedings), order one side to pay the other side’s legal costs, or declare that certain rights were violated.  
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=== 1. Other Charter Remedies Obtained through S. 24(1) ===
=== 1. Other Charter Remedies Obtained through S. 24(1) ===


S. 24(1) permits a court to craft any remedy it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. One commonly sought remedy is a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) for an abuse of process. Such a remedy is rare, however, and is only provided in the clearest of cases.  Recent case law has somewhat reinvigorated the doctrine of abuse of process and examined the potential for alternate remedies to judicial stays of proceedings where police conduct was abusive. See for example ''R v. Hart'' 2014 SCC 52. For more in-depth information on s. 24(1), it is highly recommended that legal advice be sought.  
S. 24(1) permits a court to craft any remedy it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. One commonly sought remedy is a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) for an abuse of process. Such a remedy is rare, however, and is only provided in the clearest of cases.  Recent case law has somewhat reinvigorated the doctrine of abuse of process and examined the potential for alternate remedies to judicial stays of proceedings where police conduct was abusive. See for example ''[https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc52/2014scc52.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAIciB2IGhhcnQAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1 R v. Hart]'' 2014 SCC 52. For more in-depth information on s. 24(1), it is highly recommended that legal advice be sought.  


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