Difference between revisions of "Mental Health Law and Legal Rights (14:IV)"
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Sections 7 (the right to liberty), 9 (the right to protection against arbitrary detention) and 15 (the equality provision) are particularly relevant to protecting the rights of the mentally ill. Rights protection provisions may also be applicable, as well as s 12, which concerns cruel and unusual punishment. | Sections 7 (the right to liberty), 9 (the right to protection against arbitrary detention) and 15 (the equality provision) are particularly relevant to protecting the rights of the mentally ill. Rights protection provisions may also be applicable, as well as s 12, which concerns cruel and unusual punishment. | ||
''Fleming v Reid'' (1991), 82 DLR (4th) 298 (Ont CA) dealt with the impact of s 7 on provisions of Ontario’s mental health legislation. Mentally competent involuntary patients refused treatment despite their doctors’ opinions that it would be in their best interests. The Court held that the section of Ontario’s ''Mental Health Act'', RSO 1980, c 262 that allowed a review board to override the refusal for treatment made by a substitute consent-giver of an involuntary patient based on the patient’s prior competent wishes violated the right to security of the person and was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. However, the effect this case will have on BC’s legislation is yet to be determined. | ''Fleming v Reid'' (1991), 82 DLR (4th) 298 (Ont CA) dealt with the impact of s 7 on provisions of Ontario’s mental health legislation. Mentally competent involuntary patients refused treatment despite their doctors’ opinions that it would be in their best interests. The Court held that the section of Ontario’s ''Mental Health Act'', RSO 1980, c 262 that allowed a review board to override the refusal for treatment made by a substitute consent-giver of an involuntary patient based on the patient’s prior competent wishes violated the right to security of the person and was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. However, the effect this case will have on BC’s legislation is yet to be determined. | ||
In ''Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric)'', 2006 SCC 572, it was decided that review boards have the power to issue binding orders to parties other than the accused. This power is usually used on the director of a hospital, party to the proceedings, to whom the review board cannot prescribe a specific treatment, but can impose conditions regarding treatment. It is obligated to ensure that treatments are culturally appropriate. In the ''Mazzei'' case, there was conditions for drug and alcohol rehabilitation appropriate for his first nations ancestry. | In ''Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric)'', 2006 SCC 572, it was decided that review boards have the power to issue binding orders to parties other than the accused. This power is usually used on the director of a hospital, party to the proceedings, to whom the review board cannot prescribe a specific treatment, but can impose conditions regarding treatment. It is obligated to ensure that treatments are culturally appropriate. In the ''Mazzei'' case, there was conditions for drug and alcohol rehabilitation appropriate for his first nations ancestry. | ||
A recent Supreme Court decision, ''R. v Conway'', 2010 SCC 22 (Conway) | A recent Supreme Court decision, ''R. v Conway'', 2010 SCC 22 (Conway) responded to the issue of whether or not the Ontario Review Board (ORB) has the authority to grant remedies under s 24(1) of the ''Charter''. The challenge was brought by Paul Conway, an individual found not responsible by reason of a mental disorder in 1983, who argued that his treatment and detention violated his ''Charter Rights'' and entitled him to an absolute discharge. The Supreme Court developed a test to determine whether an administrative tribunal is authorized to grant ''Charter'' remedies. The Supreme Court ruled that pursuant to s 24(1), the ORB is a “court of competent jurisdiction” but an absolute discharge was not a remedy that could be granted by the ORB under the particular circumstances. Ultimately, the Conway decision affirms the application of the ''Charter'' to administrative tribunals but limits the scope of available remedies under s 24(1) to those that have been specifically granted by the legislature. | ||
A recent case in which CLAS acted as an intervener ''(Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society'' (2012) 2 SCR 524) opened the door for groups of individuals to bring ''Charter'' challenges. In this case sex workers were granted public standing as a group to bring ''Charter'' challenges. This decision impacts mentally ill people as well. It means that in the future patients that are detained in mental health facilities could bring ''Charter'' challenges as a group, rather than on an individual basis. | A recent case in which CLAS acted as an intervener ''(Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society'' (2012) 2 SCR 524) opened the door for groups of individuals to bring ''Charter'' challenges. In this case sex workers were granted public standing as a group to bring ''Charter'' challenges. This decision impacts mentally ill people as well. It means that in the future patients that are detained in mental health facilities could bring ''Charter'' challenges as a group, rather than on an individual basis. | ||
== K. Legal Rights of Those in Group Homes == | == K. Legal Rights of Those in Group Homes == | ||