Difference between revisions of "Mental Health Law and Legal Rights (14:IV)"

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== A. Income Assistance ==
== A. Income Assistance ==


Mentally ill persons may be eligible for benefits under the Persons with Disabilities (PWD) or Persons with Persistent and Multiple Barriers to  Employment (PPMB) designations. Qualification requirements are strict, but decisions concerning eligibility can be negotiated with the Ministry  of Employment and Income Assistance or appealed. Disability Alliance BC assists with applications and appeals (for further details, see [[Introduction to Welfare (21:I) | Chapter 21: Welfare Law]]). There may be strict deadlines for these applications so it is important to not delay in these cases.
Mentally ill persons may be eligible for benefits under the Persons with Disabilities (PWD) or Persons with Persistent and Multiple Barriers to  Employment (PPMB) designations. Qualification requirements are strict, but decisions concerning eligibility can be negotiated with the Ministry  of Employment and Income Assistance or if need be appealed. Disability Alliance BC assists with applications and appeals (for further details, see [[Introduction to Welfare (21:I) | Chapter 21: Welfare Law]]). There may be strict deadlines for these applications so it is important to not delay in these cases.


== B. Employment/Disability Income ==
== B. Employment/Disability Income ==
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== H. Civil Responsibility ==
== H. Civil Responsibility ==


In general, mental incompetence or disability is no defence to an action for intentional tort or negligence. However, where a certain amount of intent or malice is required for liability, the fact that the defendant lacked full capacity to understand what he or she was doing may relieve him or her of liability.  
In general, mental incompetence or disability is no defence to an action for intentional tort or negligence. However, where a certain amount of intent or malice is required for liability, the fact that the defendant lacked full capacity to understand what he or she was doing may relieve him or her of liability. A defendant who lacks the ability to control his or her actions will not be liable. Involuntary actions do not incur liability. Anyone responsible for the care of a mentally ill person may be held responsible if the plaintiff proves a failure to take proper care supervising the person.  


A defendant who lacks the ability to control his or her actions will not be liable. Involuntary actions do not incur liability.
In civil suits, a guardian ''ad litem'' may be appointed to start or defend an action where a mentally ill person is a party and lacks the  capacity to commence or defend that action. A person involuntarily detained under the MHA appears to meet the definition in the BC Supreme Court Rules of Court of a person under a legal disability for filing or defending a court action. Therefore, the person would need to proceed through a guardian ''ad litem''.  The guardian ad litem could be a friend or a relative of the person, but could also be an organization, or another individual chosen and appointed by the court.  
 
Anyone responsible for the care of a mentally ill person may be held responsible if the plaintiff proves a failure to take proper care supervising the person.
 
In civil suits, a guardian ''ad litem'' may be appointed to start or defend an action where a mentally ill person is a party and lacks the  capacity to commence or defend that action. A person involuntarily detained under the MHA appears to meet the definition in the BC Supreme Court Rules of Court of a person under a legal disability for filing or defending a court action. Therefore, the person would need to proceed through a guardian ''ad litem''.  


Additionally, any person found not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder under the ''Criminal Code'' may not be liable for damages as a result of the offence.  
Additionally, any person found not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder under the ''Criminal Code'' may not be liable for damages as a result of the offence.  
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== I. Immigration and Citizenship ==
== I. Immigration and Citizenship ==


Section 38 of the ''Immigration and Refugee Protection Act'' deals with inadmissibility on health grounds. Pursuant to s 38(1)(c), foreign  nationals will be inadmissible if they “might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services.” This rule could potentially present a bar to admission for individuals determined to be developmentally delayed or those with a history of mental illness. However, s 38(2) lists certain exceptions. If a person may be classified as: a member of the family class and the spouse, common law spouse, or child of a sponsor; a refugee or a person in similar circumstances; a protected person, or; where prescribed by regulation, one of their family members, that person will be exempted from the rule under s 38(1)(c).  
Section 38 of the ''Immigration and Refugee Protection Act'' deals with inadmissibility on health grounds. Pursuant to s 38(1)(c), foreign  nationals will be inadmissible if they “might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services.” This rule could potentially present a bar to admission for individuals determined to be developmentally delayed or those with a history of mental illness. However, s 38(2) lists certain exceptions. If a person may be classified as (a) a member of the family class and the spouse, a common law spouse, or a child of a sponsor; (b) a refugee or a person in similar circumstances; (c) a protected person, or; (d) where prescribed by regulation, one of their family members, that person will be exempted from the rule under section 38(1)(c).


== J. The Charter ==
== J. The Charter ==


Sections 7 (the right to liberty), 9 (the right to protection against arbitrary detention) and 15 (the equality provision) are particularly relevant to protecting the rights of the mentally ill. Rights protection provisions may also be applicable, as well as s 12, which concerns cruel and unusual punishment.  
Sections 7 (the right to liberty), 9 (the right to protection against arbitrary detention) and 15 (the equality provision) of the ''Charter'' are particularly relevant to protecting the rights of the mentally ill. Rights protection provisions may also be applicable, including section 12, which concerns cruel and unusual punishment.
 
''Fleming v Reid'', (1991) OR (2d) 169 at paras 52-59 dealt with the impact of section 7 on provisions of Ontario’s mental health legislation. Mentally competent involuntary patients refused treatment despite their doctors’ opinions that it would be in their best interest. The Court held that the section of Ontario’s ''Mental Health Act'', RSO 1980, c 262 that allowed a Review Board to override the refusal for treatment made by a substitute consent-giver of an involuntary patient based on the patient’s prior competent wishes violated the right to security of the person and was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. However, the effect this case will have on BC’s legislation is yet to be determined.  


''Fleming v Reid'' (1991), 82 DLR (4th) 298 (Ont CA) dealt with the impact of s 7 on provisions of Ontario’s mental health legislation. Mentally competent involuntary patients refused treatment despite their doctors’ opinions that it would be in their best interests. The Court held that  the section of Ontario’s ''Mental Health Act'', RSO 1980, c 262 that allowed a review board to override the refusal for treatment made by a  substitute consent-giver of an involuntary patient based on the patient’s prior competent wishes violated the right to security of the person  and was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. However, the effect this case will have on BC’s legislation is yet to be determined.  
In ''Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric)'', 2006 SCC 7 at paras 46-47 [''Mazzei''], it was decided that Review Boards have the power to issue binding orders to parties other than the accused. This power is usually exercised on the director of a hospital party to the proceedings, to whom the Review Board cannot dictate a specific treatment, but can impose conditions regarding treatment. This power was granted to ensure that treatments are culturally appropriate. In ''Mazzei'', conditions were imposed regarding drug and alcohol rehabilitation to ensure that the process was appropriately adjusted to the individual’s First Nations’ ancestry.  


In ''Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric)'', 2006 SCC 572, it was decided that review boards have the power to  issue binding orders to parties other than the accused. This power is usually used on the director of a hospital, party to the proceedings, to whom the review board cannot prescribe a specific treatment, but can impose conditions regarding treatment. It is obligated to ensure that treatments are culturally appropriate. In the ''Mazzei'' case, there was conditions for drug and alcohol rehabilitation appropriate for his first nations ancestry.  
A more recent Supreme Court decision, ''R v Conway'', 2010 SCC 22 at para 78 [''Conway''] responded to the issue of whether the Ontario Review Board (ORB) has the authority to grant remedies under section 24(1) of the ''Charter''. The challenge was brought by Paul Conway, an individual found not responsible by reason of a mental disorder in 1983. He argued that his treatment and detention violated his ''Charter'' Rights, and therefore entitled him to an absolute discharge. The Supreme Court developed a test to determine whether an administrative tribunal is authorized to grant ''Charter'' remedies. The Supreme Court ruled that pursuant to section 24(1), the ORB is a “court of competent jurisdiction”, but that an absolute discharge was not a remedy that could be granted by the ORB under the particular circumstances. Ultimately, the ''Conway'' decision affirms the application of the Charter to administrative tribunals, including MHA Review Boards. However, this decision limits the scope of available remedies under section 24(1) to those that have been specifically granted to a given body by the legislature. In ''Conway'', the Review Board could make a determination that the provision was unconstitutional, but did not have the authority to strike it down.  


A recent Supreme Court decision, ''R. v Conway'', 2010 SCC 22 (Conway) responded to the issue of whether or not the Ontario Review Board (ORB) has the authority to grant remedies under s 24(1) of the ''Charter''. The challenge was brought by Paul Conway, an individual found not  responsible by reason of a mental disorder in 1983, who argued that his treatment and detention violated his ''Charter Rights'' and entitled him to an absolute discharge. The Supreme Court developed a test to determine whether an administrative tribunal is authorized to grant ''Charter'' remedies. The Supreme Court ruled that pursuant to s 24(1), the ORB is a “court of competent jurisdiction” but an absolute discharge was not a remedy that could be granted by the ORB under the particular circumstances. Ultimately, the Conway decision affirms the application of the ''Charter'' to administrative tribunals but limits the scope of available remedies under s 24(1) to those that have been specifically granted by the legislature.
In another case in which CLAS acted as an intervener (''Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society'', (2012) 2 SCR 524 at paras 73-74) opened the door for groups of individuals to bring ''Charter'' challenges. In this case sex workers were granted public standing as a group to bring ''Charter'' challenges. This decision impacts mentally ill people as well. It means that in the future, patients that are detained in mental health facilities could bring ''Charter'' challenges as a group, rather than being forced to do so on an individual basis. Organizations can start an action on behalf of a group of vulnerable people if there is no other way for the issue to be brought in front of a court.  


A recent case in which CLAS acted as an intervener ''(Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society'' (2012) 2 SCR 524) opened the door for groups of individuals to bring ''Charter'' challenges. In this case sex workers were granted  public standing as a group to bring ''Charter'' challenges. This decision impacts mentally ill people as well. It means that in the future patients that are detained in mental health facilities could bring ''Charter'' challenges as a group, rather than on an individual basis.


== K. Legal Rights of Those in Group Homes ==
== K. Legal Rights of Those in Group Homes ==
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{{REVIEWED LSLAP | date= July 29, 2019}}
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