Difference between revisions of "Introduction to Public Complaints (5:I)"

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====== (b) Errors of Law ======
====== (b) Errors of Law ======


Substantive law reviewable by the courts can be divided into two areas: statutory interpretation related to the powers of a tribunal, and interpretation related to other broader questions of law. A tribunal can be overruled if it is acting without authority. A tribunal must  generally act within the jurisdiction of the legislation that created it. Similarly, a tribunal must not misinterpret the rules that govern  the way it exercises authority, since these rules represent a precondition to the exercise of that authority. The mandate of a tribunal is  defined in large part by the intention of the legislature. If in the course of exercising its authority a tribunal misinterprets its mandate,  a court may declare the tribunal’s decision void upon judicial review. Similarly, a tribunal can be overruled  if  it  applies  the  law incorrectly  in  other  contexts.  The  enabling  statute  creating  a given  tribunal  cannot  grant  it  the  authority  to  act  illegally  or  to change the law. (c)Standards of Review Different standards of review may be imposed depending on the issue that is under review and the nature of the tribunal. The law relating  to  standards  of  review  is  quite  complicated;  thus,  for  a more detailed discussion of the issues pertaining to the standards of  review,  one  should  refer  to Dunsmuir, above.  See  also  the ATA for statutorily prescribed standards of review applicable to certain provincial tribunals. Generally,  for  questions  of  law  that  go  beyond  the  tribunal’ s specialized  area  of  expertise,  the  standard  of  review  will  be correctness— i.e., the tribunal must get the law right.  
Substantive law reviewable by the courts can be divided into two areas: statutory interpretation related to the powers of a tribunal, and interpretation related to other broader questions of law.  


A tribunal can be overruled if it is acting without authority. A tribunal must generally act within the jurisdiction of the legislation that created it. Similarly, a tribunal must not misinterpret the rules that govern the way it exercises authority, since these rules represent a precondition to the exercise of that authority. The mandate of a tribunal is defined in large part by the intention of the legislature. If in the course of exercising its authority a tribunal misinterprets its mandate, a court may declare the tribunal’s decision void upon judicial review.
Similarly, a tribunal can be overruled if it applies the law incorrectly in other contexts. The enabling statute creating a given tribunal  cannot grant it the authority to act illegally or to change the law.
====== (c) Standards of Review ======
Different standards of review may be imposed depending on the issue that is under review and the nature of the tribunal. The law relating to  standards of review is quite complicated; thus, for a more detailed discussion of the issues pertaining to the standards of review, one should  refer to ''Dunsmuir'', above. See also the ''ATA'' for statutorily prescribed standards of review applicable to certain provincial tribunals. Generally, for questions of law that go beyond the tribunal’s specialized area of expertise, the standard of review will be '''correctness'''— i.e., the tribunal must get the law right.
If  a  tribunal  is  interpreting  its  own  enabling  statute  or  a  closely related statute with which it has particular familiarity or expertise (e.g.,  the  Workers’  Compensation  Board  applying  the Workers Compensation  Act),  then  the  court  will  generally  show  some deference to the tribunal’ s interpretation. The standard of review will generally be reasonableness. Likewise,  for  questions  of  fact,  and  for  exercises  of  discretion (e.g.,  with  respect  to  the  appropriate  remedy),  the  court  will usually  show  deference  to  the  judgment  of  the  administrative decision-maker  who  saw  the  evidence  first-hand.  The  standard of  review  will  generally  be reasonableness. A  court  does  not usually  review  a  tribunal’ s  discretionary  decisions  unless  its discretion  was  not  exercised in  good  faith,  was  exercised  for an improper  purpose,  was  based  on  irrelevant  considerations, or was    otherwise  unreasonable.    The    appropriate    degree  of deference depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the discretionary decision, the knowledge and expertise of the decision-maker,  and  the  amount  of  discretion  that  is  given  by legislation.  See Baker  v  Canada  (Minister  of  Citizenship  and Immigration), [1999]  2  SCR  817  [Baker],and Suresh  v  Canada (Minister  of  Citizenship  and  Immigration),  [2002]  SCC  1  (for Charterviolations). A    third,    more    deferential    standard    of    review,    patent unreasonableness,  used  to  be  applied  in  some  circumstances. However, Dunsmuir has  expressly  done  away  with  this  standard of review, at least in the context of the common law. It is unclear at  this  time  how Dunsmuir may  have  affected  the  standards  of review  dictated  by  the ATA,  which  still  makes  reference  to “patently  unreasonable”  findings.  However,  Binnie  J  offered  the following obiter comments in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12: “The    expression ‘ patently    unreasonable’    did    not    spring unassisted  from  the  mind  of  the  legislator.    It  was  obviously intended  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  common  law jurisprudence,    although    a    number    of    indicia    of    patent unreasonableness  are  given  in  s.  58(3).  Despite  Dunsmuir, ‘ patent unreasonableness’  will live on in British Columbia, but the content of the expression, and the precise degree of deference it commands  in  the  diverse  circumstances  of  a  large  provincial administration,  will  necessarily  continue  to  be  calibratedaccording  to  general  principles  of  administrative  law.  That  said, of  course,  the  legislature  in  s.  58  was  and  is  directing the  BC courts  to  afford  administrators  a  high  degree  of  deference  on issues of fact, and effect must be given to this clearly expressed legislative intention.”Binnie J further stated that a “legislature has the power to specify a  standard  of  review  if  it  manifests  a  clear  intention  to  do  so. However,  where  the  legislative  language  permits,  the  court  (a) will  not  interpret  grounds  of  review  as  standards  of  review,  (b) will  apply Dunsmuir  principles  to  determine  the  appropriate approach  to  judicial  review in  a  particular  situation,  and  (c)  will presume the existence of a discretion to grant or withhold relief


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