BC Human Rights Code (6:III)

This information applies to British Columbia, Canada. Last reviewed for legal accuracy by the Law Students' Legal Advice Program on August 14, 2024.

The BC Human Rights Code ("HRC" or the Code) protects people from discrimination in certain protected areas of their lives. It also provides a mechanism to file a complaint when discrimination in those areas occurs. It is administered by the BC Human Rights Tribunal (“BCHRT”). The HRC applies to matters under provincial jurisdiction (as established by s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867) and covers both public and private bodies, including individuals. For example, the HRC applies to provincially regulated employers, unions, professional associations, most commercial businesses, Crown corporations, landlord-tenant relationships, and the provincial government itself.

The Tribunal’s decisions are available online on the BCHRT website. They are indexed by year dating back to 1997 and searchable based on a variety of criteria. They are also available on CanLII BC.

A. Framework of a Discrimination Complaint

There are two types of discrimination protected under the HRC: direct discrimination, and indirect or “adverse effects” discrimination.

Direct discrimination occurs when a person or group is singled out for differential treatment based on their protected characteristic(s) (M. v H.,1999 2 SCR 3). Racial slurs, sexual harassment, and homophobic comments are all examples of “direct discrimination.”

Indirect or “adverse effect” discrimination occurs when laws or policies do not overtly discriminate, but produce a disproportionate negative impact on members of groups sharing a protected characteristic (Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28). For example, disability-related claims often involve adverse effect discrimination when there is a facially neutral rule, standard, policy, or practice that creates a disadvantage for someone in connection with their disability. Please refer to Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 549 for an example of indirect discrimination.

1. Complainant's Case

As outlined in Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33, the complainant must prove the following three elements on a balance of probabilities to establish their case:

1. That they have a characteristic that is protected under the HRC;
2. That they experienced an adverse impact in an area protected by the HRC; and
3. That their protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact they experienced This is also known as the "nexus".

The complainant’s case is sometimes also referred to as prima facie discrimination, (on the move away from Latin in human rights cases, see Vik v Finamore (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 9 at paras. 48-50).

If any one of the three elements of the complainant's case is missing, there is no discrimination. If the complainant proves the three elements of their case, then the burden shifts to the respondent to justify its conduct. If the respondent proves its conduct was justified, then there is no discrimination. If the respondent’s conduct is not justified, discrimination will be found to have occurred.

Vicarious Liability: Section 44(2) of the HRC states that an employer is responsible for the actions of their employees, and an employer will be liable for an employee’s actions when the employee is acting within the scope of their authority or job duties. Employers are also responsible for providing a discrimination-free workplace. The employer should be named as a respondent in any human rights complaint involving an allegation of discrimination in the employment context.

2. Respondent's Case

In the employment context, a respondent can justify its conduct by proving on a balance of probabilities that the rule, standard, practice, or requirement being challenged is a bona fide occupational requirement ("BFOR"). In British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para 54 ["Meiorin"], the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) set out a three-step analysis for determining whether a standard is a BFOR. To be considered a BFOR the tribunal must be satisfied that:

1. The employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
2. The employer adopted the particular standard with an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and
3. The standard is reasonably necessary to fulfil its purpose. The employer must show that it could not accommodate individual employees with the protected characteristic without experiencing undue hardship.

In British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer] at 881, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the application of the Meiorin test to a public services complaint and set out the three-stage analysis for determining whether a service provider had a bona fide and reasonable justification for its conduct:

1. The respondent’s behaviour was for a purpose or goal that is rationally connected to the function being performed;
2. The respondent behaved in good faith; and
3. The respondent’s behaviour was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal, in the sense that the respondent cannot accommodate the complainant without undue hardship.

Note that most legal disputes arise in regard to the third part of the test – that is, whether the respondent reasonably accommodated the complainant to the point of undue hardship.

B. Protections and Exemptions

The HRC provides protection against discrimination in several different areas, which are listed in sections 7–14. These sections will be further detailed in order below. Please refer to Section III.A.1-7. However, for many of these protected areas, the HRC provides certain exceptions for which discrimination is not prohibited.

Additionally, section 41, commonly referred to as the group rights exemption, allows non-profit organizations to engage in what might otherwise be deemed prohibited discriminatory conduct. It allows charitable, philanthropic, educational, and other not-for-profit organizations to give a preference to members of the identifiable group or class of persons they serve. For more information, please see Vancouver Rape Relief Society v Nixon, 2005 BCCA 601 at paras 43-59 [Nixon]. (Please note that this case involves a sex-binary-focused discussion of transgender identity that may be troubling for some readers).

Furthermore, under section 42, it is not discriminatory to plan, advertise, adopt, or implement an employment equity program that has the objective of ameliorating the conditions of individuals or groups who are disadvantaged because of Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, and achieves or is likely to achieve that purpose. Section 42 also gives the Human Rights Commissioner jurisdiction to approve special programs that are aimed at improving the situation of individuals or groups that have suffered historical disadvantage. If pre-approved, a special program is deemed not to contravene the Code.

1. Discriminatory Publication

Section 7 deals with forms of discrimination against individuals or groups of individuals, which are published, displayed, or made public. This section prohibits hate literature and other such communications that expose or are likely to expose someone in a protected group to hatred or contempt, as well as publications that indicate discrimination or intent to discriminate against a protected group. Please refer to Oger v Whatcott (No 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at paras 93—97 for the former, and Li v Mr B, 2018 BCHRT 228 at paras 95—97 [Li] for the latter.

Exception: Section 7 does not apply to communications that are intended to be private or are related to activities otherwise permitted under the HRC, see s. 7(2) and Li at paras 98–104.

2. Discrimination in Accommodations, Services and Facilities “Customarily Available to the Public”

Section 8 states that a person may not deny or discriminate against any person or class of persons regarding an accommodation, service, or facility customarily available to the public because of that person’s Indigenous Identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and/or age.

University of British Columbia v Berg, [1993] 2 SCR 353 at 384–387 [Berg] explains the concept of “customarily available to the public”. A service is customarily available to the public if the nature of the relationship is public. Courts and tribunals look at the relationship between the facility and the complainant, as well as the nature of the service itself. In Berg, the court found that a university has its own public and that the relationships between students and professors, who present the public face of the university, are public in this context. Please refer to HMTQ v McGrath, 2009 BCSC 180 at paras 89–93 for a more recent case that discusses when a service is “customarily available to the public”.

Additionally, courts have found that services provided to members of a group who come together as a result of a private selection process, based on their personal attributes do not qualify as services “customarily available to the public”, and are therefore not subject to section 8 of the HRC. Please refer to Marine Drive Golf Club v Buntain et al and BC Human Rights Tribunal, 2007 BCCA 17 at paras 48–56.

While there is no enumerated list of relationships that count as "customarily available to the public," locales such as pubs, night clubs, hotels, theatres, transportation services, education facilities, insurance, medical treatment in hospitals and clinics, strata council and property management services in condominiums, services provided by police, access to sidewalks and public space, government services, and participation in sporting events have all been found to entail public relationships. Licensing services and facilities may also involve public relationships. For example, discrimination prohibited by section 8 was ultimately found when the BC Motor Vehicle Branch maintained a blanket refusal to issue driver's licenses to those with certain visual impairments regardless of actual driving ability: BC (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v BC (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer].

Legislation is not a “service customarily available to the public” and bare challenges to legislation can’t proceed at the HRT, see e.g. Phillips v BC Ministry of the Attorney General, 2019 BCHRT 76 at paras 11–12.

In Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, a school district cancelled a special education program, requiring a dyslexic student to enroll in specialized private school. The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed whether the school district discriminated against the student by failing to provide necessary accommodation, and ultimately upheld the BC Human Rights Tribunal’s finding of discrimination.

Defences: Adverse treatment on the basis of a protected characteristic is not discrimination if it can be shown to be supported by a “bona fide and reasonable justification” (“BFRJ”) (as per the wording of section 8(1)). See Section III.A.2 for the three-part Grismer test to justify a discriminatory standard by raising a BFRJ. (see also Subsection 6: Discrimination in Employment and the Duty to Accommodate).

Exceptions: Section 8(2) also contains certain built-in exceptions. Discrimination based on sex is permitted insofar as it relates to the maintenance of public decency. For a case on the interpretation of public decency in the context of excluding transgender peoples from public washrooms, see Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investments Ltd. (No. 3), 1999 33 CHRR 467 in which the Tribunal rejected the argument that it was necessary to exclude a transgender woman from the washroom matching her gender identity in order to maintain "public decency."

Discrimination based on sex, physical or mental disability, or age is permitted insofar as it relates to the determination of premiums or benefits under life or health insurance policies. Note that statutory exceptions to human rights legislation are to be narrowly construed (Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.), [1992] 2 SCR 321).

3. Discrimination in Purchase and Rental of Property

Section 9 provides that a person or class of persons must not be denied the opportunity to purchase real property due to their Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation and/or gender identity or expression.

Section 10 states that a person shall not be denied the right to occupy any space that is represented as being available for occupancy or be discriminated against with respect to a term or condition of the tenancy on the basis of Indigenous Identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, and/or lawful source of income.

Defences: Although sections 9 and 10 do not contain language specifically providing for a defence to a claim of discrimination under these provisions, like all respondents, landlords and property sellers may be able to justify prima facie discrimination if they can satisfy the three elements of the Grismer/Meiorin test. This will require that they accommodated the complainant to the point of undue hardship.

Exceptions: Section 10(2)(a) says the protection from discrimination in tenancy does not apply if the tenant is sharing the use of any sleeping, bathroom, or cooking facilities with the person making the representation (e.g. as a roommate). Furthermore, the reserving of specific residences for individuals aged 55 or older or for people with disabilities does not constitute discrimination (HRC, s 10(2)(b) & (c)).

4. Discrimination in Employment Advertisements and Interviews

Section 11 prohibits employment advertisements that express limitations, specifications, or preferences based on Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity or expression and/or age. Refer to Anderson v Thompson Creek Mining Ltd Endako Mines, 2007 BCHRT 99.

Exception: An employment advertisement that expresses a limitation, specification or preference as to a protected characteristic may be permitted if it is based on “bona fide occupational requirement(s)” as per the wording of section 11. There are also exceptions for non-profit organizations and employment equity programs (see Exemptions on 6-6).

For case law on discrimination during the interview process, please refer to Khalil v Woori Education Group, 2012 BCHRT 186 at paras 29-45. Under section 13, an employer cannot refuse to employ someone on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination unless there is a bona fide occupational requirement (see Subsection 6: Discrimination in Employment and the Duty to Accommodate).

5. Discrimination in Wages

Section 12 states that wage parity between sexes is required for similar or substantially similar jobs. Please refer to Kraska v Pennock, 2011 BCSC 109. Most of the remedies under this section are also available under section 13, which does not have a limitation on the period of time during which wages can be claimed.

Limitation Dates: Section 12(5) of the HRC states:

(a) "The action must be commenced no later than 12 months from the termination of the employee's services, and

(b) The action applies only to wages of an employee during the 12 month period immediately before the earlier of the date of the employee's termination or the commencement of the action."

Most of the remedies under this section are also available under section 13, which does not have a limitation on the period of time during which wages can be claimed.

Exception: A difference in the rate of pay between employees of different sexes based on a factor other than sex is allowed, provided that the factor on which the difference is based would reasonably justify the difference.

6. Discrimination in Employment and the Duty to Accommodate

Section 13 provides that no person shall refuse to employ another person or discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment on the basis of Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, and/or because that person has a criminal record that is unrelated to the employment. Please refer to Ratzlaff v Marpaul Construction Ltd, 2010 BCHRT 13 for one example of an employment case.

This section may also extend to volunteers depending on the circumstances (Nixon). When determining whether a volunteer is captured by this section of the HRC, the Tribunal will consider the following:

1. If there is a formal process to recruit volunteers;
2. If there is a training process with defined tasks for volunteers;
3. Whether volunteers have to agree to follow the organizations policies and practices;
4. If there are requirements about when or how often a volunteer must be available; and
5. The role of volunteers in the organization.

For more information on volunteers, see Ferri v Society of Saint Vincent de Paul and another, 2017 BCHRT 123 at paras 29-33.

Because all individuals over 19 are protected by the ground of age, individuals in both the public and private sector are able to choose the age at which they wish to retire and are protected from discrimination based on age (HRC, s 1).

Defence of Bona Fide Occupational Requirement ("BFOR"): Adverse treatment on the basis of a protected characteristic may be justified when it relates to a “bona fide occupational requirement” (BFOR): see s. 13(4). In British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para 54 [Meiorin], the Supreme Court of Canada established a three-part test for establishing a BFOR.

1. The employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
2. The employer adopted the particular standard with an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and
3. The standard is reasonably necessary to fulfil its purpose. The employer must show that it could not accommodate individual employees with the protected characteristic without experiencing undue hardship.

For a specific example of a BCHRT case that applies the BFOR test in a disability context, please refer to Kerr v Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd (No 4), 2009 BCHRT 196 ["Kerr"].

Undue Hardship: What may be considered undue hardship varies by employer and depends on the circumstances. In Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 985—986, the Supreme Court of Canada held that undue hardship is more than a minor inconvenience, and that actual interference with the employer’s business must be established. Factors the court may consider include the financial cost of accomodation, health and safety concerns, and the flexibility and size of the workplace.

The burden of proving undue hardship lies on the respondent and will require evidence that all reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, have been provided. For more information on the duty to accommodate, please see the BC Human Rights Clinic’s "Legal Information" page and their blog.

Other Exemptions: Distinctions based on age are not prohibited if they relate to a bona fide seniority scheme. Distinctions based on marital status, physical or mental disability, sex, or age are permitted under bona fide retirement, superannuation, or pension plans, and under bona fide insurance plans, including those which are self-funded by employers or provided by third parties (HRC, s 13(3)).

7. Discrimination by Unions, Employer Organizations or Occupational Associations

Section 14 states that trade unions, employers’ organizations, and occupational associations may not deny membership to any person or discriminate against a person on the basis of Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, and/or unrelated criminal record. Please refer to De Lima v Empire Landmark Hotel and Major, 2006 BCHRT 440.

Since persons are not covered by section 14, protection against denial of membership has been held to apply only against an implicated union, organization, or association, and not against an individual. Please refer to Ratsoy v BC Teachers’ Federation, 2005 BCHRT 53 at para 23. This differs from other protections granted by the HRC, which, in appropriate circumstances, generally allow an action to be brought against both an organization (e.g. an employer) and its individual members (e.g. a manager).

There are two limited ways in which unions can be held liable for discrimination. The first is by creating or participating in formulating a discriminatory workplace rule, and the second is by impeding an employer’s efforts to accommodate an employee (Chestacow v Mount St Marie Hospital of Marie Esther Society, [2018] BCHRT No 44 at para 32 ["Chestacow"]). In respect of the latter, a union may be required to waive seniority rights or other collective agreement obligations to facilitate the accommodation of an employee with a protected characteristic, such as a disability.

8. Retaliation

Section 43 of the Code protects people from retaliation for filing a human rights complaint, or for indicating that they might file a human rights complaint. It also protects from retaliation anyone who assists, or who might assist, someone to make a complaint.

The test for retaliation is set out in Gichuru v Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 at paras 50–58. To prove retaliation, a complaint must show:

a) The respondent was aware that the complainant had made a complaint;

b) The respondent engaged in or threatened to engage in conduct described in s. 43; and

c) There is sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the previous complaint.

Sufficient connection may be established by proving that the respondent intended to retaliate, or by the tribunal drawing that inference when the respondent can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in prohibited retaliatory conduct. This reasonable perception is assessed from the point of view of a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct.

In The Sales Associate v. Aurora BioMed (No. 3), 2021 BCHRT 5, the Tribunal interpreted the meaning of the protection for someone who “might” make a complaint. The Tribunal concluded that the protection applies where the retaliator is aware that a person might pursue some legal recourse for discrimination. It is not necessary to prove that the retaliator was specifically aware of the possibility of a human rights complaint at the Human Rights Tribunal (see paras. 151-163).

C. Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination

1. General

Prohibited grounds of discrimination include Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age (for those 19 and over), criminal record (that is not related to the employment, union, or occupational association), and lawful source of income (in tenancy only).

A complainant can file a complaint on a combination of grounds. A prohibited ground does not need to have been the sole or primary motivating factor behind the discrimination; it need only have been one contributing factor. Please refer to Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras 45–52.

Not all grounds of discrimination are protected in all the areas listed in each of the sections 7–14 of the HRC. The grounds of discrimination that apply depend on the protected area in question. One must first decide which section is involved and then check to see which grounds are associated with that section. Please refer to the following chart:.

Protected Grounds	Protected Areas
	Written Publications	Public Services & Accommodation	Purchase of Property	Tenancy	Employment Advertisements	Employment	Unions & Associations
Indigenous Identity	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Race	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Colour	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Ancestry	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Place of Origin	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Political Belief	x	x	x	x	v	v	v
Religion	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Marital Status	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Family Status	v	v	x	v	v	v	v
Physical or Mental Disability	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Sex	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Sexual Orientation	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Gender Identity or Expression (NEW)	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Age	v	v	x	v	v	v	v
Criminal or Summary Conviction	x	x	x	x	x	v	v
Source of Income	x	x	x	v	x	x	x

To determine whether a violation of the HRC has occurred, consult the relevant section of the HRC and review recent case law. Case law can be found on the BC Human Rights Tribunal www.bchrt.bc.ca/law-library/decisions website), indexed by year, and is also available on CanLII BC.

Discrimination need not be intentional (HRC, s 2). Any policy or action that has an adverse effect on a protected group and which cannot be justified will be considered discriminatory. The policy or act does not have to affect every person in the group for it to be considered discriminatory. For example, if a policy discriminates against only people who are pregnant it could still be considered sex discrimination. It is also possible that an act or policy may affect men as well as women, but affect one sex to a disproportionate degree, in which case it could also qualify as sex discrimination.

Discrimination can also be established on an intersectional basis. This means that the discriminatory conduct had an adverse impact on the basis of multiple protected grounds. These grounds occur simultaneously and cannot easily be separated from one another. It is not always necessary to establish that each individual ground has been discriminated against where intersectional discrimination can be established. Please refer to Radek v Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd, 2005 BCHRT 302 at paras 463–467.

2. Indigenous Identity

Indigenous Identity refers to being First Nations, Métis, or Inuit. Indigenous Identity is a protected ground against discrimination in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

While there are few cases that feature the Tribunal considering Indigenous identity as its own distinct protected ground, there are many more that look at Indigenous identity as being a protected ground through race, ancestry, or place of origin. One such case is Smith v Mohan (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 52, where the complainant, an Indigenous woman and member of the Tsimshian and Haisla Nations, was discriminated against by her landlord, who continually tried to evict the complainant because she was smudging in her apartment unit. See also Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275, which involved a finding of discrimination by the Vancouver Police against an Indigenous mother.

3. Race, Colour, Ancestry, and Place of Origin

The grounds of race, colour, ancestry, and place of origin are included in the HRC as a means to combat racism and racial discrimination. Each of these grounds are protected in the HRC and may be cited individually in connection with a discriminatory incident or grouped together to better illustrate a particular situation. For further information on how the above grounds interact, please refer to Torres v Langtry Industries Ltd, 2009 BCHRT 3.

The grounds of race, colour, ancestry, and place of origin are protected in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

Discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, or place of origin can also be established where the respondent caused harm to the claimant by taking advantage of a vulnerability caused by the claimant's race, colour, ancestry, or place of origin. For more information, see PN v FR and another (No 2), 2015 BCHRT 60.

For a recent case concerning discrimination on the basis of race in the employment context, please see Francis v BC Ministry of Justice (No 3), 2019 BCHRT 136.

The Tribunal has recognized that racism can be subtle and is sensitive to this fact. Please refer to Mezghrani v Canada Youth Orange Network Inc, 2006 BCHRT 60 at para 28.

The Tribunal has acknowledged that while anti-Black racism exists in Canada and continues to create impediments to the full and free participation of Black Canadians in the economic, social, political and cultural life of BC, there is a lack of cases dealing with anti-Black racism at the Tribunal level. Given that anti-Black racism is a “distinct form of racism,” the lack of these types of cases has been a factor that supports a complaint being accepted despite being filed late; please refer to Umolo v. Shoppers Drug Mart and others, 2021 BCHRT 166 at para 35.

4. Political Belief

The HRC provides protection from discrimination due to political beliefs and/or affiliations only in the protected areas of employment advertising, employment, and membership in a trade union, employer’s organization, or occupational association (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

In BC, few human rights cases have been decided on the ground of political belief. The Tribunal has, however, identified two key principles in determining whether a claimant’s belief should be protected under the HRC:

1. Political belief is to be given a liberal definition; it is not confined to partisan political beliefs. Hence, political beliefs are not limited to beliefs about recognized or registered political parties.
2. Political belief is not unlimited; for example, views about matters such as business or human resources decisions an employer may make do not come within its ambit.

Please refer to Prokopetz and Talkkari v Burnaby Firefighters’ Union and City of Burnaby, 2006 BCHRT 462 at para 31 and Fraser v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 2016 BCHRT 124.

See Bratzer v Victoria Police Department, [2016] BCHRT No 50 for a unique example of how political belief can be framed. In this case, an officer of the Victoria Police Department successfully argued that his stance against the criminalization of illicit drugs and his involvement in a not-for profit that advocates for such views amounted to a political belief.

In Wali v Jace Holdings, 2012 BCHRT 389 at para 117, the Tribunal determined that comments regarding matters affecting the regulation of a profession could constitute a political belief. This was narrowed to the particular legislative framework and mandate of the College of Pharmacists. The Tribunal took into account that the issue was a legislative initiative involving public welfare and was being debated in the community of pharmacists in determining that the belief was a protected political belief.

5. Religion

Religious discrimination cases have helped to define several of the fundamental ideas and standards that comprise human rights law in Canada. Matters before the courts have routinely addressed discriminatory incidents concerning religious faith, beliefs, customs, and practices. The HRC protects against discrimination based on religion in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

As is the case in the Charter section 2(a) case law on freedom of conscience and religion, a claimant before the Tribunal must show that their religious belief or practice is sincere, but is not required to show that it is objectively required or recognized by a particular religious faith. Please refer to Friesen v Fisher Bay Seafood Limited, 2009 BCHRT 1, at para 57.

Atheism is encompassed within the protected ground of religion: Mangel and Yasué obo Child A v. Bowen Island Montessori School and others, 2018 BCHRT 281 at para 210.

The duty to accommodate obliges employers to accommodate the religious practices of their employees so long as doing so does not cause undue hardship. Practices requiring accommodation may be linked to customs involving prayer, dietary restrictions, clothing requirements, or time off on religious holy days. Please refer to Renaud v Central Okanagan School District No 23, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 982.

6. Family Status and Marital Status

Family status generally refers to parent-child relationships, but can and does encompass other family relationships including those between siblings, in-laws, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, and cousins. For case law on the definition of family status and the test for discrimination on that basis see Miller v British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, 2009 BCHRT 34 at para 17.

Marital status normally refers to couples with a spouse-like relationship. The HRC extends protection to all individuals regardless of their status (i.e. married, common-law, single, separated, divorced or widowed). Issues involving family and marital status may often overlap and may be cited concurrently to fully illustrate a certain situation.

The HRC protects against discrimination based on marital and family status in all the areas protected under the HRC, with the exception that family status is not protected in the area of purchase of property (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General). This means adult-only buildings and strata corporations are permitted.

Protections from discrimination on the basis of marital and family status also confer protection on the basis of the identity of the complainant’s spouse or family member: B v Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2002 SCC 66.

The ground of family status also protects people from discrimination in respect of their childcare, and possibly other family care obligations. The law regarding the test that applies in the context of family status discrimination cases involving childcare obligations is unsettled in Canada.

In BC, the test for family status discrimination in employment was most recently considered in British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) v. Gibraltar Mines Ltd., 2023 BCCA 168. The BC Court of Appeal held that to establish discrimination based on family status, the complainant must show that a term or condition of employment results in a serious interference with a substantial parental or other family duty or obligation of an employee. This protection applies equally when the interference is a consequence of a change in the term of employment, or a change in the employee’s circumstances (see para. 77).

The Federal Court of Appeal set out its own four-part test for family status discrimination in federal cases in Canada (Attorney General) v Johnstone, 2014 FCA 110, at para 93 ["Johnstone"]. Under Johnstone, a complainant must show that a child is under their care and supervision, the issue engages the individual’s legal responsibility for that child as opposed to a personal choice, they have made reasonable efforts to find alternative solutions with no reasonable alternative solution is available, and the impugned workplace rule interferes with the childcare obligation in a more than trivial or insubstantial way.

7. Physical or Mental Disability

Disability is not defined in the HRC. However, the concept of physical disability, for human rights purposes, generally indicates a “physiological state that is involuntary, has some degree of permanence, and impairs the person’s ability, in some measure, to carry out the normal functions of life” (Boyce v New Westminister (City) (1994), 24 CHRR D/441 at para 50 ["Boyce"]).

More recent cases have confirmed that a disability must have a certain level of severity, permanence or persistence: see e.g., Li v Aluma Systems and another, 2014 BCHRT 270 at para 41. In Morris v BC Rail, 2003 BCHRT 14 at para 214 ["Morris"], the Tribunal set out the following three considerations for assessing whether an individual has a physical or mental disability:

1. [T]he individual’s physical or mental impairment, if any;
2. [T]he functional limitations, if any, which result from that impairment; and
3. [T]he social, legislative or other response to that impairment and/or limitations… assessed in light of the concepts of human dignity, respect and the right to equality.

Furthermore, according to Morris at para 207, proof of impairment and/or limitation, while relevant, will not be required in all cases. See McGowan v Pretty Estates, 2013 BCHRT 40 at paras 26-28 for more information.

The HRC protects against discrimination based on physical or mental disability in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

The protection of the HRC extends to those who are perceived to have a disability or to be at risk of becoming disabled in the future. As such, the Tribunal has rejected the application of strict criteria to determine what constitutes a physical or mental disability. For example, protection has been specifically applied to persons with AIDS, persons who are HIV positive, and persons believed to be HIV positive. Please refer to McDonald v Schuster Real Estate, 2005 BCHRT 177 at para 24 and J v London Life Insurance Co (1999), 36 CHRR D/43 at para 42 ["London Life Insurance"].

As noted above, protection from discrimination due to physical disability extends to discrimination on the basis of a perceived propensity to become disabled in the future. In London Life Insurance at para 46, the Tribunal found that the HRC prohibited discrimination against a person based on the fact that his spouse was HIV positive. Protection under this ground has also been extended to those who are suffering from addictions issues. For example, Handfield v North Thompson School District No 26, [1995] 25 CHRR D/452 at paras 139–143 recognized alcoholism as both a physical and mental disability.

Where a behaviour or policy adversely affects a protected group or person, either directly or indirectly due to their disability (or any other protected characteristic), there is a duty to accommodate, meaning that all reasonable efforts must be taken to accommodate the group or person up to the point of undue hardship. Examples include installing wheelchair access (Walsh v Pink, 2018 BCHRT 174 at paras 104-111) or safety handrails (Ferguson v Kimpton, 2006 BCHRT 62 at para 68). The duty to accommodate may also include allowing workers to return gradually to the workplace after an injury or serious illness.

8. Sexual Orientation

The HRC prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Such discrimination does not require a complainant to prove their sexual orientation nor that a given respondent believed them to have a particular orientation. In School District No 44 (North Vancouver) v Jubran, 2005 BCCA 201, Mr. Jubran was a high school student, subjected to homophobic insults and harassment from other students. This conduct was found to constitute discrimination, even though Mr. Jubran did not identify as homosexual and his harassers denied believing that they in fact thought he was homosexual.

The HRC protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

For a case regarding discrimination on this basis against patrons of a restaurant in the context of services customarily available to the public, please see Pardy v. Earle and others (No. 4), 2011 BCHRT 101.

9. Sex (Including Sexual Harassment, Pregnancy)

Discrimination on the basis of sex, which is prohibited under the HRC, includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is defined as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects a work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the harassment” (Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 1252 at 1284 ["Janzen"]).

The HRC protects against discrimination based on sex in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

In PN v FR and another (No 2), 2015 BCHRT 60, the HRT awarded $50,000 for injury to dignity to a domestic foreign worker who was sexually harassed and assaulted. This is among the highest injury to dignity award the Tribunal has ever ordered. This case also involved allegations of discrimination based on family status, race, age, colour, and place of origin.

Sexual harassment can take a number of forms. One example is when an employer or a supervisory employee requires another employee to submit to sexual advances as a condition of obtaining or keeping employment or employment-related benefits. It may also occur when employees are forced to work in an environment that is hostile, offensive, or intimidating, such as where an employer allows pornography to be posted in the workplace.

It is not generally necessary for an employee to make an internal complaint to their employer before filing a complaint, although this may be relevant to the compensation the employer is ordered to pay if the complaint is successful. There is also no requirement of continuing harassment; a single incident may be sufficient if it is sufficiently egregious.

Whether the conduct was “unwelcome” is assessed on an objective standard: would a reasonable person have known that the conduct was unwelcome? If the respondent knew or ought to have known that the conduct was unwelcome, this part of the test is made out. A target of harassment is not required to expressly object to the conduct for it to be reasonably understood to be unwelcome. The law recognizes that a person's behaviour "may be tolerated and yet unwelcome at the same time" (Mahmoodi v. University of British Columbia and Dutton, 1999 BCHRT 56 at para 140).

It must also be shown that the alleged discriminatory conduct is “reasonably perceived to create a negative psychological and emotional environment for work” (Janzen at 1263). The test must also account for the customary boundaries of social interaction in the circumstances. Factors that are examined to determine the limits of reasonableness in a particular context include the nature of the conduct, the workplace environment, the type of prior personal interaction, and whether a prior objection or complaint was made. However, it is no defence to harassment, to show that harassing behaviour was traditionally tolerated in a workplace.

For a more recent case involving discrimination on the basis of sex, and more specifically sexual harassment in the employment context, see Araniva v RSY Contracting and another (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 97.

There are also examples of cases involving sex discrimination that did not amount to sexual harassment. Please refer to Mottu v MacLeod, 2004 BCHRT 76 at para 41, where the Tribunal found that dress code requirements based on sex could constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. In Lund v Vernon Women’s Transition House Society, 2004 BCHRT 26, the Tribunal found that an employer’s refusal to allow a female employee to breastfeed her child at work could also constitute sex discrimination. See also The Sales Associate v Aurora Biomed Inc. and others (No. 3), 2021 BCHRT 5.

10. Gender Identity or Expression

This protected ground has been in force since 2016, and therefore fewer decisions relating to this ground are currently available. For a recent Tribunal decision issued under the ground of gender identity or expression, please refer to Oger v Whatcott (No 7), 2019 BCHRT 58.

The HRC protects against discrimination based on gender identity or expression in all the areas protected under the HRC (See the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

Please also see Li v. Mr. B, 2018 BCHRT 228, where the respondent, the complainant's landlord, showed a photograph of the complainant (who was male-identifying) in a dress to the complainant's supervisor in an attempt to cause an adverse effect on the complainant's employment. The HRT found that this constituted discrimination based on gender identity and expression.

For a case involving a nonbinary person, whose coworker refused to use they/them pronouns to refer to them, please see Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137.

Prior to the inclusion of gender identity or expression in 2016, the Tribunal had found that being transgender was a protected characteristic under the ground of sex. Please refer to Dawson v Vancouver Police Board (No 2), 2015 BCHRT 54 ["Dawson"]. Dawson establishes that misgendering trans individuals (addressing a trans person using a pronoun, name, or gender marker other than that which the trans person uses to identify themselves) constitutes discrimination. Discrimination may also include the denial of trans-specific medical services (Dawson).

11. Age (19+)

11. Age (19+) Age can refer to an individual’s legal age, membership in a specific age-category, or a generalized characterization of a specific age. The HRC protects against discrimination based on age in all the areas protected under the HRC except the purchase of property (see the chart above in Subsection 1: General). Please refer to Miu v Vanart Aluminum and Tam, 2006 BCHRT 219 at para 18.

Age protection is restricted to those 19 years of age and over. However, those under 19 years can still bring complaints to the BCHRT based on grounds other than age.

12. Unrelated Criminal or Summary Conviction

BC’s HRC protects individuals against discrimination based on a criminal or summary conviction only in the areas of employment, trade unions, employers’ associations and occupational associations, so long as the conviction is unrelated to the employment or the intended employment of the individual (see the chart above in Subsection 1: General).

This protection includes a perceived conviction (i.e. relating to arrests, stayed charges or acquittals). Please refer to Purewall v ICBC, 2011 BCHRT 43 at para 21, Clement v Jackson and Abdulla, 2006 BCHRT 411 at para 14; and Korthe v Hillstrom Oil Company Ltd (1997), 31 CHRRD/82 at paras 23-28.

To establish whether or not a conviction may affect an employment decision, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the relationship between the conviction and the job description. As such, employers must take into account the circumstances of the conviction in order to determine whether or not the charge relates to individual’s employment. In Woodward Stores (British Columbia) v McCartney (1983) 43 BCLR 314 at paras 7-9, Justice MacDonald laid out a list of criteria to be considered in making this determination. These criteria are as follows:

• Does the behaviour which formed the basis of the charge, if repeated, compromise the employers’ ability to conduct business safely and effectively?
• What were the circumstances and details of the offence, e.g., what was the person’s age at the time of the offence and were there any extenuating factors?
• How much time has passed since the charge? What has the individual done since that time and has there been any indication of recidivism? Has there been evidence of the individual’s desire for rehabilitation?

13. Lawful Source of Income

Lawful source of income is only a protected ground in the area of tenancy (see the chart above in Subsection 1: General). The HRC protects the rights of individuals on social assistance or disability pensions, for example, who might otherwise be denied housing from being discriminated against in tenancy situations.

Please refer to Tanner v Vlake, 2003 BCHRT 36 at paras 22–26 for further discussion on this protected ground. For a more recent case, please see Day v Kumar and another (No 3), 2012 BCHRT 49.

D. Procedural Options for Employees

An employee who is dealing with an employment-related legal issue may have more than one procedural option to choose from. These include:

1. Employer’s Internal Complaint Procedure

Assuming one exists, this is the most immediate way to obtain a resolution to a workplace issue. Consult the workplace’s policies to determine whether an internal complaints process exists and, if so, whether it is likely to yield a helpful resolution of the issue. Note that employees are not required to make use of internal procedures before filing a human rights complaint or other legal proceeding.

2. Grievance and Arbitration (Union)

Unionized workers are entitled to representation by their union. Labour arbitrators have jurisdiction to apply the HRC, and grievances often move more quickly than human rights complaints. However, if the union does not pursue a grievance relating to a human rights issue, the worker may wish to file their own human rights complaint and may even decide to name the union as a party if the worker has grounds to believe the union is complicit in the alleged discrimination. Alleging that the union has failed to provide adequate representation will not be sufficient to qualify as a breach of the HRC on its own; the union must have engaged in the discrimination.

As previously stated (see Section III.B.7: Discrimination by Unions, Employer Organizations, or Occupational Associations), there are two ways in which a union may be found liable for discrimination. First by creating or participating in formulating a discriminatory workplace rule, and second by impeding an employer’s efforts to accommodate a disabled employee (Chestacow at para 32).

Initiating the grievance procedure can be a good starting point, and can be followed by initiating a human rights complaint. A grievance and a human rights complaint can also be filed in tandem. If the matter is not resolved during the initial stages of the union grievance procedure, an arbitration hearing may be held, and an arbitrator will determine liability and relief. The human rights complaint may be placed in deferral while the grievance process proceeds. If the grievance process resolves the worker’s human rights issue, the human rights complaint will be dismissed. See Sebastian v Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2019 BCCA 241 for some of the risks of parallel proceedings in this context.

3. Human Rights Complaint

Another option is to file a human rights complaint with the BC Human Rights Tribunal (see above for the grounds, areas, exemptions, complaint process, etc.) or, under federal jurisdiction with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (see below for the grounds, areas, exemptions, process, etc). The Tribunal can award lost wages, expenses, and damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. However, if a claimant is also seeking severance pay, lost wages, or expenses in a civil suit, they will not be allowed to recover the same damages from both proceedings.

4. Employment Standards Branch

Employees may choose to file a complaint through the Employment Standards Branch (ESB) if their employer has breached the Employment Standards Act (see Chapter 9: Employment Law). There is a six-month limitation period from the date of the breach. A complainant can file claims in both the ESB and civil court (either Small Claims or Supreme Court) for employment-related issues, including wrongful dismissal. These actions do not bar the complainant from also bringing a human rights complaint relating to the same matter. Remedies awarded by the Employment Standards Tribunal are intended to make the employee “whole” financially by way of compensation rather than reinstatement. It is important to note that the ESB does not deal with alleged discrimination. If the employee recovers unpaid wages through the ESB, they cannot “double-recover” and seek those same damages in the BCHRT or another forum.

5. Civil Action

A final option is to bring a civil action for wrongful dismissal either in Small Claims Court (see Chapter 22: Small Claims of the LSLAP Manual) or the BC Supreme Court, depending on the amounts claimed. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the common law will not provide a remedy for discrimination per se in the employment context. Please refer to Keays v Honda Canada Inc, 2008 SCC 39 at para 67 [Keays].

The court in Keays held that breaches of the HRC must be remedied within the statutory scheme of the HRC itself. Thus, even if the reason for dismissal was discriminatory, in a civil action, the claimant will generally only be able to recover damages based on their wrongful dismissal and/or inadequate notice (severance pay). See Chapter 9: Employment Law of the LSLAP Manual. Accordingly, compensation for the discrimination itself must be awarded by the Tribunal.

The court may further compensate the claimant in a civil action if the employer has acted unfairly or in bad faith when dismissing an employee. The basis for these additional damages is a breach of the implied term of an employment contract that employers will act in good faith in the manner of dismissal (i.e. payment for such damages can be deemed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the formation of the contract). In Keays the Supreme Court of Canada held that any such additional award must be compensatory and must be based on the actual loss or damage suffered by the employee, which can include expenses related to mental distress stemming from the manner of dismissal. Compensable conduct might include, but is not limited to, attacking the employee's reputation at the time of dismissal, misrepresentations regarding the reason for the dismissal, or dismissal meant to deprive the employee of a pension benefit or other right such as permanent resident status. However, normal distress and hurt feelings arising from the dismissal itself are not grounds for additional damages.

The courts are even more conservative in their approach to awarding punitive damages meant to punish the employer for their conduct in dismissal. Punitive damages will only be awarded if the employer’s conduct was harsh, vindictive, reprehensible, malicious, and extreme in nature. Thus, if the claimant is primarily concerned with being compensated for injuries to their dignity and/or denouncing their employer’s discriminatory behaviour, they should file a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal alongside a civil action for wrongful dismissal.

Whatever procedural route an employee ultimately chooses to pursue, if said employee is experiencing on-going harassment on a prohibited ground of discrimination, they should maintain records or a journal with dates, times, places, witnesses, details of particular incidents, and even a description of the emotional effects of the harassment.

E. The Process for Human Rights Complaints

The BC Human Rights Tribunal handles complaints made under the HRC. The following chart depicts the process of a complaint at the Tribunal and the time in between the various stages of the process (prepared by the BC Human Rights Clinic, a program of the Community Legal Assistance Society [“CLAS”]):

The first step in filing a complaint with the Tribunal is to fill out a Complaint Form, which is available at the Tribunal's office, on its website or from other local government offices. It is also possible to file the complaint online on the Tribunal's website. There are helpful self-help guides to filling out Complaint and Response forms on the Tribunal’s website. You should also consult the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and Practice Directions for guidance on the various steps in the process.

1. Who Can File a Complaint?

A complaint may be made by an individual, on behalf of a group or class, or by someone acting as a representative of the named person(s). If the Complaint Form is being filled out on behalf of another person, group, or class of persons, then a secondary form called the Representative Complaint Form must also be filled out and must accompany the Complaint Form when sent to the Tribunal. The person filling out the Complaint Form is called the complainant. The person or organization whom the complaint is against is called the respondent.

2. How to File a Complaint

The Complaint Form can be filed with the Tribunal via mail or fax. The Complaint Form can also be filled out and submitted online from a computer or a mobile device. Alternatively, the Complaint Form can be submitted to the Tribunal by email. Complainants may access the Complaint Form and other valuable resources at the BC Human Rights Tribunal website (see Section II.B: Resources). There are different Complaint Forms depending on whether the complaint is being made by an individual (Form 1.1) or a group (Form 1.3). If you are filling out a Complaint Form on behalf of someone else, then the appropriate form is Form 1.2.

The party filing the complaint should be aware of the time limits. There is a one-year limitation period. Complaints alleging continuing contraventions of the Code may be accepted as long as at least one incident of alleged discrimination occurred within the one-year limitation period: see Code s. 22(2).

Late-filed complaints may be accepted if it is in the public interest to do so, under certain very limited circumstances, as per s. 22(3) of the Code In order for a member of the Tribunal to accept all or part of the complaint under s. 22(3), the Tribunal must determine that a) it is in the public interest to accept the complaint, and b) no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay. The Tribunal’s assessment of what is in the public interest depends on a contextual consideration of a number of factors including: the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the length and reason for the delay in filing, whether the complainant had access to legal advice, and the novelty or importance of the human rights issues raised: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at paras. 53-81. The Tribunal also considers “the respondent’s interest in going about its activities without the worry of stale complaints”: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. This list of factors is not exhaustive.

The BC Court of Appeal has found it to be within the public interest to accept a complaint that was filed late if the complainant was operating off erroneous legal advice regarding the one-year limitation date: The Parent obo the Child v. The School District, 2020 BCCA 333. The Tribunal has also found that it can be in the public interest to accept late complaints where the delay is due to a disabling condition: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 21. See also Sheriff v. Fairleigh Dickenson University, 2023 BCHRT 40 at para. 38, where the Tribunal discussed the impact of trauma on a person’s ability to file a complaint within the one-year time limit.

The BC Human Rights Tribunal has been severely backlogged over the last couple of years. Potential complainants should be aware that it often takes a year or more for a case to be initially screened and accepted for filing. The Tribunal has developed a strategy to address its backlog, which it most recently updated on December 15, 2023. For more information, see the announcement here.

3. Urgent Complaints ("Fast-Track")

If the complaint is urgent, a complainant may request a fast-track process. To be eligible for a fast track, you must show that fast tracking or changing the process will help get to a “just and timely resolution” of the complaint.

The complainant may want to fast-track the process if the complainant risks losing the appropriate remedy if urgent action is not taken by the HRT (for example, the complaint is about an eviction notice and the complainant will have to move out in 30 days, without a fast-tracked solution). A party may also wish to fast-track the process if they are at risk of losing the chance to prove their case (for example, the respondent’s main witness is moving out of Canada soon). For more information on the fast track process, please refer to the BCHRT website.

4. Screening

Once the Complaint Form is filed, the Tribunal will review the form to determine if it fits under the HRC and if it appears to meet the one-year limitation period. If the Tribunal believes that it may not have the power to deal with the complaint in substance or believes that the complaint has been filed out of time, the complainant will generally be given a chance to respond before the Tribunal decides whether to proceed with the complaint. If the Tribunal believes it can proceed, it will send the Complaint Form to the respondent for a response to the complaint.

A complainant must set out a case of discrimination under the HRC on their initial complaint form. If the elements are not set out, then the Tribunal may not accept the complaint. Even if accepted, it could still be vulnerable later to an application to dismiss under section 27 of the HRC.

In order to set out the complainant’s case, the complainant must allege facts that, on their face (that is to say, assuming they are all true), satisfy the following three elements:

1. That they have a characteristic that is protected under the HRC;
2. That they experienced an adverse impact with respect to an area protected by the HRC; and
3. That their protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact they experienced.

A complainant need not establish that their protected characteristic was the sole or primary reason for their adverse treatment. It is sufficient to establish that it was one reason for their adverse treatment. For greater analysis of this topic please refer to Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39; and Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61.

A complainant is not required to provide evidence at the time they file their complaint. The complaint form simply needs to tell the story, identify all of the allegations of discriminatory treatment, and satisfy the three criteria set out above.

5. Disclosure Obligations

Disclosure refers to the sharing of information with the other parties. In order for all parties to prepare for their case it is essential that information is properly shared. Information that must be disclosed includes:

1. All documents relevant to the complaint, response, as well as the remedy being requested (this must be disclosed after a complaint is filed);
2. A list of witnesses (this must be disclosed after a hearing is scheduled);
3. A detailed explanation of the remedy (for the complainant), or a response to the proposed remedy (for the respondent); and
4. Any expert evidence or opinion (must be presented to the other party within 90 days of the hearing).

Evidence that has not been disclosed cannot be presented at a hearing. An attempt to do so may negatively affect a party’s case and may even lead to an order for costs by the Tribunal. A failure to disclose can also simply prevent a complaint from going forward, or prevent a respondent from filing an application to dismiss.

6. Settlement Meeting

Parties may agree to a settlement meeting at any time after the complaint has been filed. The Tribunal schedules an Early Settlement Meeting after accepting the complaint for filing, which the parties can opt out of if they choose. Most human rights complaints settle, either through a settlement meeting or direct negotiations between the parties or their counsel. Guides for settlement meetings and hearings are available from the Tribunal on its website.

At the settlement meeting, a neutral and impartial mediator who is knowledgeable in human rights law will work with the parties in order to help them try to reach an agreement. Generally, a settlement will require both sides to compromise, whether that is a complainant accepting less compensation than they initially sought, or a respondent accepting some measure of responsibility. In a settlement meeting, it is important to listen to the other side’s perspective, assess how it impacts the strength of your case, and remain open-minded regarding the remedy you are prepared to accept to resolve the complaint.

Additionally, settlements can allow for creativity in determining a resolution. While the Tribunal may be limited in its ability to address the damages, mediation can result in constructive results such as public apologies or a practical solution to the issue at hand.

This process also allows for a quicker resolution of the issue in a more informal setting, where information is kept confidential. Negotiations are without prejudice, meaning they cannot be used in future hearings, and the mediator involved will not be a part of the final hearing. The process is voluntary and the Tribunal cannot force the parties to participate in mediation or enter into a settlement agreement. If the parties do voluntarily agree to settle their dispute, as part of the terms of settlement, the complainant will file a Complaint Withdrawal Form (Form 6). A settlement agreement is a legally binding agreement, and if one side does not comply with its terms, the other party can take to steps to enforce it.

If both parties cannot agree on a resolution, the mediation will end with no settlement agreement.

7. Covid-19 and Mask Wearing Complaints

Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Tribunal developed a new process for processing complaints about mask wearing in the BCHRT. For complaints filed after March 31, 2022, the HRT will dismiss any complaint that does not include the criteria set out in the Practice Direction. This criteria requires complainants to demonstrate that their protected personal characteristic, if that is a physical disability, actually inhibits the wearing of a mask. If the complainant does not provide this information in their Complaint Form then their complaint will be dismissed without an opportunity to provide more information.

F. Remedies

Remedies should be considered early when deciding whether or not to pursue a claim in any administrative tribunal. Available remedies for a justified complaint are listed in section 37(2) of the HRC.

Non-pecuniary (not financial) remedies include:

• an order that the respondent cease the discriminatory conduct,
• a declaratory order that the conduct complained of is, in fact, discriminatory, and
• an order that the respondent take steps to ameliorate the effects of the discrimination, such as the implementation of human rights policy and training.

People seeking advice on drafting should be directed to the BC Human Rights Tribunal website, which provides detailed information on the availability and applicability of specific remedies (see Section II.B: Resources).

Pecuniary (financial) remedies include:

• compensation for lost wages/salary,
• expenses incurred due to the discrimination,
• re-instatement of a lost benefit, and
• compensation for injury to dignity.

Unlike severance pay, compensation for lost wages is not based on the concept of reasonable notice. A successful claimant may recover lost wages for the entire period between their dismissal and the hearing date if they can show that they have been making reasonable efforts to find new employment.

The purpose of an award for injury to dignity is to compensate a person whose rights under the Code have been violated. It is not to punish a respondent. Damages awarded for injury to dignity have increased over the last decade, and the tribunal has made it clear that the trend for such damages is upwards (see Biggings obo Walsh v Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 [Walsh]). Currently the highest award in BC is $176,000 (Francis v BC Ministry of Justice (No.5), 2021 BCHRT 16). Historically, however, most damages in this category are under $10,000.

The BC Human Rights Clinic has a compiled list of awards given by the HRT, sorted by ground, updated quarterly and available here.

The Tribunal generally consider three broad factors in determining injury to dignity awards: the nature of the violation, the complainant's vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant (Gichuru v The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 260, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396). Importantly, while injury to dignity awards commonly follow in cases where discrimination is established, this is not guaranteed, as seen in Holt v Coast Mountain Bus Company, 2012 BCHRT 28 at para 233. For further information regarding compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, please visit the BC Human Rights Clinic's website.

Remember, to claim any type of damage, the complainant must lead evidence. If the complainant fails to lead evidence as to the effect the discrimination had on their emotional state and dignity, this may impact the Tribunal’s assessment of damages. Furthermore, if the respondent can prove that the complainant has failed to mitigate their losses, a complainant may not be entitled to wage loss compensation.

The Tribunal may not award damages for lost wages/salary following a discriminatory dismissal during a period for which the claimant was medically incapable of working (Senyk v WFG Agency Network (No 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at para 434). This is because, even absent the discrimination, the claimant would not have been able to earn wages or a salary. (but see Eva obo others v Spruce Hill Resort and another, 2018 BCHRT 238 at para 214).

There is no maximum limit on damage awards. However, if a claimant seeks a remedy at both the Human Rights Tribunal (e.g. for lost wages) and in civil court or another dispute resolution forum (e.g. for severance pay), and is successful with both proceedings, they are not entitled to double recovery and will receive the amount through only one of the proceedings. There are several cases where the award for loss of wages was in the range of $300,000. See Kerr Kerr v Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd (No 4), 2009 BCHRT 196.

Additionally, section 37(2) gives the Tribunal the power to award compensation for expenses incurred due to the discrimination found, which may include expenses such as counselling fees incurred because of the discrimination, or expenses incurred to attend a hearing. Legal expenses incurred after the filing of a complaint are not compensable, though legal expenses incurred prior to the filing of a complaint may be. See Fraser v. BC Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations (No. 6), 2019 BCHRT 195 at para. 16.

A final order of the Tribunal may be registered in the BC Supreme Court so that it is enforceable as though it were an order of the court. No appeal procedure is provided for in the HRC; individuals dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s decision must seek judicial review in BC Supreme Court pursuant to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSBC 1996, c 241 (see Chapter 5: Public Complaint Procedures of the LSLAP Manual).

G. Costs

The general rule is that costs will not normally be awarded in a human rights case. Pursuant to section 37(4) of the HRC, the purpose of awarding costs is to penalize a party who acts improperly during the course of the complaint, thereby interfering with the objectives of the Tribunal. In these cases, costs are awarded punitively and do not necessarily reflect the actual expenses incurred by the other party due to the improper conduct.

H. Dismissal of a Complaint Without a Hearing

As mentioned above, the Tribunal may refuse to accept a complaint for filing if it does not have jurisdiction due to the nature of the complaint or if it is filed late. Once a complaint has been filed, however, the Tribunal may nevertheless dismiss it prior to a hearing, on application from the respondent or on its own motion, for a variety of reasons (HRC, s 27). The following outlines some of the reasons why the Tribunal may dismiss a filed complaint (check the HRC for a complete list):

1. Complaint Outside the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction

The Tribunal will not proceed with a complaint where it is persuaded that the complaint is not, in fact, based on a form of discrimination enumerated by the HRC, or that the complaint falls within federal jurisdiction. Even if the Tribunal accepts a complaint for filing, the respondent may still have the option to dispute jurisdiction.

2. Substance of Complaint Dealt with by Another Proceeding

Where another proceeding, such as a labour arbitration, has adequately resolved the substance of a complaint, it will usually be dismissed. A complaint may also be deferred if such an alternative proceeding is pending. The number of other proceedings capable of adequately dealing with a human rights complaint is however, quite limited.

3. No Reasonable Basis for Holding a Hearing

The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint where the Tribunal is persuaded that the complaint is made in bad faith, would be of no benefit to the complainant, would not further the purposes of the HRC, and/or has no reasonable prospect of success. The most recent Annual Report from the BCHRT indicates that applications to dismiss under section 27 of the HRC succeeded in fully dismissing the complaint 49% of the time. No reasonable prospect of success is the most common reason for dismissing a complaint. Please refer to Marquez v Great Canadian Casinos, 2011 BCHRT 117 at paras 29–38.

If you are responding to an application to dismiss a complaint, it is important in most cases to provide evidence in support of the Complainant’s contention that the complaint should be allowed to proceed to a hearing. While the burden of persuading the Tribunal that the complaint should be dismissed is on the respondent, the complainant does need to provide sufficient evidence to take their complaint out of the realm of “speculation and conjecture.” An affidavit attaching relevant exhibits from the client is preferable, though an unsworn statement will also likely be acceptable in most cases.

4. Complaint Brought Outside Limitation Period

As mentioned above, there is a one-year limitation period for filing a complaint. The one-year period begins from the last instance of any continuing discrimination. If at least one alleged incident of discrimination in a complaint falls within the one-year limitation period, other alleged incidents of discrimination dating back farther than one year may be accepted as a continuing contravention of the Code. The issue of whether, or how many, multiple instances of discrimination will be considered to constitute a “continuing contravention” (thus effectively extending the one-year limitation period) is often disputed. See Bjorklund v BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 204 at paras 13-14 for a recent discussion of how to define a “continuing contravention”; see also District v Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at paras 46–65.

However, under section 22(3) of the HRC, the Tribunal has discretion to accept late-filed complaints regardless of whether there is a “continuing contravention”. The requirements for doing so are that it is in the public interest to accept the late complaint, and no substantial prejudice will be caused to any party because of the delay in filing (Chartier v Sooke School District No 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para 12).

Whether it is in the public interest to accept a complaint filed outside the one-year time limit is a multi-faceted consideration, which is governed by the purposes of the HRC, and assessed on a case-by-case basis. Factors that may be important considerations in determining whether it is in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint include the reasons for the delay, the length of the delay, the significance of the issue raised in the complaint and fairness in all the circumstances. The list of factors that the Tribunal may consider is non-exhaustive:. British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24.

I. Responding to an Application to Dismiss

When faced with an application to dismiss, it is important to meaningfully engage with the reasons behind the application, providing supporting evidence when necessary. If the complainant does not provide evidence in response to an application to dismiss, it may result in a case being dismissed that did hold legal merit. Evidence can be as simple as a statement, although a sworn affidavit is preferable. The statement or affidavit should attach documents that help support the complainant’s argument that the complaint should be allowed to proceed to a hearing. The respondent would then have an opportunity to respond to the arguments raised by the complainant.

If the Tribunal agrees to dismiss the complaint then the complaint process will not continue any further. Applications to dismiss are subject to judicial review.

J. Case Path Pilot

Unfortunately, the number of applications to dismiss filed by respondents has resulted in significant backlog and delay at the Tribunal. In response, the Tribunal is currently running a pilot project under s. 27 of the Human Rights Code. On May 1, 2024, the pilot project was extended for a further year.

Under the Case Path Pilot, the default case path will be for the complaint to proceed directly to a hearing. Only when the Tribunal determines that an application under s. 27 would further the just and timely resolution of the complaint will it permit a respondent to file an application to dismiss. For more information see the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on the Case Path Pilot.

K. Judicial Review

If an individual disagrees with a decision of the Tribunal, they may ask the Supreme Court of British Columbia for a “judicial review”. A judicial review differs from an appeal to a higher court. In an appeal, the court has the authority to decide whether or not it agrees with a decision. In a judicial review, the BC Supreme Court simply decides whether there is are grounds for review and may only disturb the Tribunal’s decision if the applicant can demonstrate that the Tribunal:

• Made an “error of law”, (e.g., an incorrect interpretation of the HRC);
• Made a finding of fact that is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence;
• Acted unfairly with regards to the rules of procedure and natural justice; or
• Disregarded legislative requirements; used its discretion arbitrarily, in bad faith, or for an improper purpose; or based its decisions on irrelevant factors.

These standards of review applicable to the Tribunal’s decisions are set out in s. 59 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

If the Tribunal has made any of these errors, the Court may set aside the decision and will usually direct the Tribunal to reconsider the matter. Section 57 of the Administrative Tribunals Act mandates that an application for a judicial review must be submitted within 60 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision was issued. In order to seek a judicial review, an individual is required to prepare a petition and affidavit, file the petition and affidavit at the BC Supreme Court, and serve a copy of the filed petition and affidavit on the Tribunal, the Attorney General of British Columbia, and any person whose interests may be affected by the order Court is asked to make.

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