Anonymous

Difference between revisions of "Consumer Protection from Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts (11:IV)"

From Clicklaw Wikibooks
Line 56: Line 56:
The Director need only show that a deceptive practice would tend to cause consumers to make an error in judgment, but does not need to show that any consumer made an error in judgment, to enforce the Act against a supplier.  
The Director need only show that a deceptive practice would tend to cause consumers to make an error in judgment, but does not need to show that any consumer made an error in judgment, to enforce the Act against a supplier.  


The ''BPCPA'', similarly to the ''Trade Practices Act'', should be interpreted as imposing “a high standard of candour, especially on suppliers who choose to commend their wares” (''Rushak v. Henneken'', [1991] 6 WWR 596, [1991] BCJ No 2692 (CA) at para 17 [''Rushak'']).  
The ''BPCPA'', similarly to the ''Trade Practices Act'', should be interpreted as imposing “a high standard of candour, especially on suppliers who choose to commend their wares” (''Rushak v Henneken'', [1991] 6 WWR 596, [1991] BCJ No 2692 (CA) at para 17 [''Rushak'']).  
Where there is an embellishing endorsement of the goods, and the supplier knows the goods may be defective in an important respect, these facts must be disclosed (''Rushak''). For the consumer to set aside the consumer transaction on the basis that the supplier engaged in a deceptive act or practice, the representation must be material – what is material depends on the individual circumstances of the transaction (''Rushak'').  
Where there is an embellishing endorsement of the goods, and the supplier knows the goods may be defective in an important respect, these facts must be disclosed. For the consumer to set aside the consumer transaction on the basis that the supplier engaged in a deceptive act or practice, the representation must be material – what is material depends on the individual circumstances of the transaction (''Rushak'').  


The court may draw the conclusion that a practice is deceptive on the basis of vague contractual language in circumstances where that language allowed the supplier to claim that additional work was not part of the original contract: see ''British  Columbia (Director of Trade Practices) v Van City Construction Ltd'', [1999] BCJ No 2033 (SC) (QL).
The court may draw the conclusion that a practice is deceptive on the basis of vague contractual language in circumstances where that language allowed the supplier to claim that additional work was not part of the original contract: see ''British  Columbia (Director of Trade Practices) v Van City Construction Ltd'', [1999] BCJ No 2033 (SC) (QL).
5,109

edits